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It is of the essence of the economic function of a securities exchange that
it be a free market-free of the artificiality of manipulation (the laying of
hands on the scales) as it is free of the unfairness of insider trading (playing
cards with a marked deck).1
INTRODUCTION
When a corporate officer uses confidential corporate information
in trading in his corporation's securities, his conduct constitutes ille-
gal insider trading.2 But what happens when that officer, because of
his corporate position, gains confidential information about another
corporation's stock and then trades on that information? As an "out-
sider," does his conduct then constitute illegal insider trading? Intui-
1 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FuNDAmENTAiS OF SECURITES REGULATION 930 (3d
ed. 1995).
2 This is known as classical insider trading. See infra Part IA..
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tively, anyone who possesses confidential information about a stock
seems like an "insider."3 Thus, the unwary public might expect that
those individuals privy to this information-whether inside or outside
the corporation-may not trade. Until the Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. O'Hagan,4 however, the courts stood divided as to
whether the federal securities laws prohibited this "outsider" trading
on inside information. 5
Why the controversy? How could the law prohibit insiders but
not outsiders from trading on nonpublic corporate information? 6
One reason is that the vague language of section 10(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 ("the Act") 7 and Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") Rule 10b-5, 8 which is relevant in most insider
trading cases, fails to define "insider trading."9 Another reason for
the outsider trading controversy is the Supreme Court's reliance on
fiduciary relationships instead of the possession of inside informa-
tion. 10 In O'Hagan, the Supreme Court attempted to resolve this
problem of "outsider trading," but its adoption of a theory based on
the misappropriation of information created several analytical and
practical difficulties."
3 For example, someone who appreciates an "inside joke" is anyone who possesses
pertinent background information. When the term "insider" appears in the context of
securities laws, however,the meaning refers only to officers, fiduciaries, or others in a simi-
lar position of trust or confidence. See FED. SEC. CODE § 1603(b) (1980). Although these
individuals most likely possess the requisite information, the term "insider" nonetheless
refers to a person's status and not to his knowledge.
4 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
5 For an account of the division among the circuits, see infra Part II.D.
6 Federal mail and wire fraud statutes may prohibit this conduct. See infra Part II.C.1;
see also Brief of Amid Curiae North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc.,
and Law Professors in Support of Petitioner at 6, United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642
(1997) (No. 96-842) (stating that "the federal mail and wire fraud statutes independently
prohibit most misappropriation"). In addition, state corporate law probably would police
internal corporate affairs. See infra note 310 and accompanying text.
7 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mnn (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
8 17 C.F.R- § 240.10b-5 (1998).
9 See infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
1o See Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella
Restatement, 70 CAL. L. Rxv. 1, 3 (1982) (indicating that the Supreme Court "has made the
fiduciary principle a consideration of utmost importance").
11 The actual harm of insider trading is open to debate. There is a strong intuition
that insider trading is unfair. See id. at 2 (stating that the "acceptance [of laws prohibiting
insider trading] seems to rest more on the strongly held intuition that insider trading is
unfair"); Carol B. Swanson, Reinventing Insider Trading. The Supreme Court Misappropriates the
Misappropriation Theory, 32 WAKE FoREsr L. Riv. 1157, 1161 (1997) ("The most common
argument against insider trading is the intuitive feeling that such behavior is simply unfair
or immoral."). One commentator theorized that allowing insider trading eventually would
adversely affect all shareholders-not just those "victims" of insider trading-by widening
the bid-asked price spread of a security.
The upshot is that this defensive reaction of market makers affects all
shareholders, reducing the price at which shareholders can sell and raising
the price at which investor must buy. More importantly, the injury is felt
1358 [Vol. 84:1356
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The Supreme Court's decision in O'Hagan significantly departs
from prior insider trading law. It has induced a number of commen-
tators to debate the validity of the misappropriation theory, to evalu-
ate the current state of insider trading jurisprudence, and to propose
how Congress, the SEC, and the Court can clarify this area of law.' 2
While this Note likewise discusses the merits of the misappropriation
theory and its impact on securities law, it also attempts to offer a new
approach to insider trading theory and a new solution to the insider
trading problem. This Note examines the evolution of insider trading
law from its pre-Chiarella13 origins, and it rethinks insider trading the-
ory from the perspective of the fraudulent nondisclosure doctrine of
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551 (2) (e).14 This Note then proposes
not only by those trading in the stock of the particular company in which
the insider trader is active, but by all shareholders trading in all stocks....
The key point here is that the victims of insider trading are not simply
those who traded with the party possessing inside information, but rather
all shareholders, who must trade in less efficient markets because of the
market makers' need to protect themselves.
John C. Coffee, Jr., Is Selective Disclosure Now Lawful, N.Y. L.J., July 31, 1997, at 5. On the
other hand, some commentators have argued that a closer analysis reveals that insider
trading is not more unfair than other accepted transactions. See Dennis W. Carlton &
Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. Rv, 857 (1983) (arguing
that insider trading is desirable and that it promotes market efficiency because it aids the
dissemination of information). This Note will assume the Supreme Court's position: in-
sider trading-trading on nonpublic information-threatens the integrity of otherwise
honest and fair markets. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658-59 (1997).
12 See, e.g., Paula J. Dalley, From Horse Trading to Insider Trading. The Historical Anteced-
ents of the Insider Trading Debate, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1289 (1998) (tracing the develop-
ment of the misappropriation theory and comparing fraud-by-silence in insider trading law
to analogous contexts in the past two centuries); Richard W. Painter et al., Don't Ask, Just
TelL Insider Trading After United States v. O'Hagan, 84 VA. L. REv. 153 (1998) (criticizing
the Court's adoption of the misappropriation theory, suggesting methods of utilizing the
theory effectively against insider trading, and proposing ways that Congress or the SEC can
better define insider trading laws); A.C. Pritchard, United States v. O'Hagan: Agency Law
and Justice Powell's Legacy for the Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. REV. 13 (1998) (praising
the Supreme Court's adoption of the misappropriation theory and arguing that the misap-
propriation theory is superior to the classical theory); Joel Seligman, A Mature Synthesis:
O'Hagan Resolves "Insider" Trading's Most Vexing Problems, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (1998) (con-
tending that the Supreme Court's adoption of the misappropriation theory provides a
workable definition of insider trading and clarifies prior insider trading decisions, but ad-
ding that it will not necessarily lead to predictable results); ElliottJ. Weiss, United States v.
O'Hagan: Pragmatism Returns to the Law of Insider Trading, 23 J. CORP. L. 395 (1998)
(describing O'Hagan as a resolution of a perceived tension between constructive and infor-
mational fraud, praising the misappropriation theory as a significant step toward a compre-
hensive regulatory framework for insider trading, and indicating the remaining areas that
insider trading theory must address).
13 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
14 One commentary proposes applying the "latent defect" doctrine to insider trading
and invokes section 551(2) (e). See Ronald F. Kidd, Note, Insider Trading The Misappropria-
tion Theory Versus an 'Access to Information" Perspective, 18 DEL. J. CoR'. L. 101, 108 n.31
(1993). Kidd's commentary, however, does not analyze the applicability of the section
551(2) (e) doctrine in depth. In particular, it does not demonstrate how insider trading
theory escapes Chiarella's assertion that possession of material, nonpublic information by
1999] 1359
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thatjoint enforcement of this nondisclosure doctrine by the securities
exchanges and the judiciary may achieve adequate insider trading
regulation.
Part I discusses the emergence of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 as
the governing law in insider trading jurisprudence. Although section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 are not specific in their regulation of insider
trading, early interpretations of the statutory and regulatory language
have articulated notions of contractual fairness. This Part examines
the origin of insider trading liability theory, which arose from this fair-
ness-oriented approach.
Part II explores the Supreme Court's treatment of insider trading
liability and the subsequent development of insider trading regula-
tion. During this period, the Supreme Court entertained fairness-ori-
ented theories, fiduciary-based theories, and a non-"insider trading"
case involving Rule lOb-5; lower courts debated the applicability of the
misappropriation theory to section 10(b); and the SEC promulgated
Rule 14e-3(a).15
Part III discusses the O'Hagan decision. In O'Hagan, the Supreme
Court adopted the misappropriation theory, holding that a section
10(b) violation occurs when an individual commits an undisclosed
breach of fiduciary duty by secretly trading securities on entrusted
confidential information. 16 The Court also recognized to some extent
the validity of Rule 14e-3(a) and maintained that federal mail and
wire fraud statutes may reach insider trading.17
Part IV analyzes the misappropriation theory of O'Hagan. This
Part discusses the theory with respect to the requirements of section
10(b), the policy behind section 10(b), its consistency with prior case
law, and its practical application. It argues that the misappropriation
theory is problematic in these areas and that insider trading jurisprn-
dence needs a new approach.
Part V examines the insider trading problem from the perspec-
tive of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551 (2) (e). The "basic facts" doc-
trine of section 551 (2) (e) is superior to the misappropriation theory
because it directly addresses the perceived problem of insider trading:
insider trading constitutes cheating in a game in which every trader
may possess or have access to certain basic information. This Part de-
bunks possible reasons for the Court's failure to adopt an approach
itself does not give rise to a duty to disclose. See infra note 69. Kidd also proposes a return
to Professor Brudney's "access to information" theory. See Kidd, supra, at 106 & n.23. For a
discussion of this theory, see infra Part II.A.3.
15 17 C.F.Rt § 240.14e-3(a) (1998).
16 See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647.
17 See id. at 676-78.
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based on section 551(2)(e), and it demonstrates how section
551(2) (e) is applicable to insider trading.
Part VI offers a solution to the insider trading problem. This Part
proposes that the law allow exchanges to promulgate certain disclo-
sure rules that would facilitate the enforcement of section 10(b) viola-
tions. The rules and the section 551(2) (e) doctrine would allow
courts to apply section 10(b) to both insider and outsider trading.
I
TiE DEVELOPMENT OF INSIDER TRADING LLizBri
A. Securities Exchange Act Section 10(b) and SEC-Promulgated
Rule 10b-5
The stock market crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depres-
sion prompted Congress to pass extensive legislation 18 to regulate the
securities industry and to prevent the recurrence of a national eco-
nomic crisis.19 Specifically, Congress passed the Securities Exchange
Act of 193420 with the goal of promoting the fairness and integrity of
the securities markets.2 ' Congress perceived that insider trading
could pose a threat to the market,22 and under section 16 of the Act, it
prohibited corporate directors, officers, and controlling shareholders
from engaging in short-swing trading.23 Even though section 16 pro-
hibits trading regardless of whether the insider actually uses inside
information, its purpose is to prevent the unfair use of information in
securities trading.24 Congress adopted this overinclusive rule to avoid
problems of proof.2 5
The Securities Exchange Act does not expressly prohibit the use
of inside information in trading. To reach unforeseen or otherwise
unproscribed deceptive devices, however, the drafters of the Act also
18 See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-aa (1994 & Supp. II 1996); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78ajj (1994 & Supp. II 1996); Trust Indenture Act of
1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa-bbbb (1994 & Supp. II 1996); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15
U.S.C. § 80a-1 to -52 (1994 & Supp. II 1996); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-1 to -21 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
19 See S. RExP. No. 73-792, at 2, 3 (1934).
20 Ch. 404,48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (1994
& Supp. III 1997)).
21 See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1994) (indicating that Congress drafted the Act in part "to
insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets"); see alsoJennifer D. Antolini et al.,
Securities Fraud, 34 AM. CIM. L. REv. 983, 984 (1997) ("The purpose of [the] Act[ ] is to
ensure vigorous market competition by mandating full and fair disclosure of all material
information in the marketplace.").
22 See 15 U.S.C. § 78b.
23 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (imposing restric-
tions on directors, officers, and 10% shareholders from purchasing and selling within a six-
month period).
24 See H.R. REP. No. 98-355, at 3 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2275-76.
25 See Painter et al., supra note 12, at 160-61 nn.29, 31.
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included a "catchall" 26 provision in section 10(b). 27 The original pur-
pose of section 10(b) was not to prohibit insider trading;28 section 16
fulfilled that function. 29 In fact, section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 (or any
of the federal statutes, rules, or regulations) do not define "insider
trading" or "inside information" (or "misappropriation," for that mat-
ter).30 Section 10(b) simply states in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of
the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors. 31
26 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206 (1976).
27 See Painter et al., supra note 12, at 161 ("Section 10 (b) ... allowed the Commission,
under the watchful eye of the federal courts, to prohibit 'manipulative or deceptive' con-
duct as it arose and as law enforcement strategies became available.").
28 See id. at 160 ("Although Congress was concerned about insider trading in 1934, it
seems unlikely that it specifically envisioned insider trading as coming within the proscrip-
tions of Section 10(b)."); see also Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 202 ("[T]he intended scope of
§ 10(b) ... [is not] revealed explicitly in the legislative history of the 1934 Act, which deals
primarily with other aspects of the legislation.").
29 See Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REv. 1, 56-
57 (1980) ("The conventional wisdom is that Congress . .. expressed its concern with
insiders' informational advantage by enacting section 16.")
Indeed, legislative history indicates that the purpose of section 10(b) was to serve as a
catchall provision:
In addition to the discretionary and elastic powers conferred on the
administrative authority, effective regulation must include several clear stat-
utory provisions reinforced by penal and civil sanctions, aimed at those ma-
nipulative and deceptive practices which have been demonstrated to fulfill
no useful function. These sanctions are found in sections 9, 10 and 16.
S. REP. No. 73-792, at 6 (1934).
30 See H.R. REP. No. 100-910, at 7-8 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6044
("'Insider trading' is not defined in the securities laws, but the term is used broadly to
refer to the purchase or sale of securities while in possession of 'material' information
(generally, information that would be important to an investor in making a decision to buy
or sell a security) that is not available to the general public (that is 'nonpublic').");
Langevoort, supra note 10, at 3 (stating that "neither [Rule lOb-5] nor [section 10(b)]
expressly prohibits insider trading"); Painter et al., supra note 12, at 160 ("The text of
Section 10(b) . . . does not even mention insider trading."); Swanson, supra note 11, at
1164 ("Insider trading is neither defined nor expressly prohibited by federal regulation.").
31 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b); 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
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Pursuant to its section 10(b) rule-making authority, the SEC promul-
gated Rule 10b-5 in 194232 to combat securities fraud.3 3 Rule 10b-5
states in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of
the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud .... or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.34
Despite the lack of insider trading language, the courts have con-
strued section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder as
prohibiting specific trading based on material, nonpublic informa-
tion.35 Today, section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are the Government's
primary means of regulating current forms of insider trading.3 6
B. The Fairness Approach
Prior to the Supreme Court's treatment of insider trading in
Chiarella v. United States,37 adjudicators and commentators articulated
contract notions of fraudulent misrepresentation and the duty of
good faith and fair dealing in applying section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
to insider trading. These contract doctrines typically allow the rescis-
sion of agreements between private parties when there is intentional
nondisclosure of material information. 38 The pre-Chiarella insider
trading theories applied these common law principles of face-to-face
private agreements to impersonal securities transactions in public
markets.
32 See H.R. REP. No. 98-355, at 3 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2276.
33 See Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAw. 793, 922
(1967) (statement of Milton Freeman) (indicating Commissioner Sumner Pike's approval
of Rule lOb-5: " ' Well .... we are against fraud, aren't we?'").
34 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998).
35 See Antolini et al., supra note 21, at 993-94; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Law Profes-
sors and Counsel in Support of Respondent at 4-5, United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642
(1997) (No. 96-842) ("The federal courts for almost thirty years... have held that trading
by corporate insiders in possession of material nonpublic information is... in violation of
§ 10(b) and Rule lob-5.").
36 Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 also have appeared in private securities litigation
(between a shareholder and the company whose stock he owns) but with a much narrower
scope. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (indicating heightened pleading
requirements for private Rule lOb-5 plaintiffs); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 754-55 (1975) (holding that only actual purchasers and sellers of securities
may bring a private Rule lOb-5 suit).
37 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
38 See RESATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRACrs § 161 cmt. b (1981).
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1. Cady, Roberts: The Disclose or Abstain Rule
In In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,3 9 the SEC first postulated that section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 prohibited using inside information to trade
securities in public markets. 40 According to Cady, Roberts, section
10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 require a party to a securities transaction to dis-
close material information if two principal elements exist:
first,. . . a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to infor-
mation intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and
not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent
unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such informa-
tion knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.4 1
If the party chooses not to disclose, "the alternative is to forego the
transaction. ' 42 This obligation that the SEC articulated in Cady, Rob-
erts is now recognized as the "disclose or abstain" rule.43
The language of Cady, Roberts's disclose or abstain rule is similar
to that of Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 161(b):
A person's non-disclosure of a fact known to him is equivalent to an
assertion that the fact does not exist...
(b) where he knows that disclosure of the fact would correct a mistake
of the other party as to a basic assumption on which that party is
making the contract and if non-disclosure of the fact amounts to a
failure to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable stan-
dards of fair dealing.44
In addition to sharing similar language regarding fairness and knowl-
edge of the other party's ignorance, Cady, Roberts and section 161 (b)
parallel each other in their treatment of the effect of disclosure. As
the SEC indicated in Cady, Roberts, 'We, and the courts have consist-
ently held that insiders must disclose material facts which are known
to them by virtue of their position but which are not known to persons
with whom they deal and which, if known, would affect their investment
judgment."45 This language reflects section 161(b), which mandates
that "one is expected to disclose only such facts as he knows or has
reason to know will influence the other in determining his course of
action"46
-9 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
40 See id. at 911.
41 Id. at 912 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
42 Id. at 911.
43 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980).
44 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CGoiNTcrs § 161(b) (1981) (typeface altered) (empha-
sis added).
45 40 S.E.C. at 911 (emphasis added).
46 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 cmt. b (1981) (emphasis added).
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In Cady, Roberts, the SEC construed section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
broadly. It indicated that section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 "are not in-
tended as a specification of particular acts or practices which consti-
tute fraud, but rather are designed to encompass the infinite variety of
devices by which undue advantage may be taken of investors and
others."47 In other words, even if nondisclosure of inside information
does not constitute fraud, it nonetheless "may be viewed as a... prac-
tice which operate[s] as a fraud or deceit upon the purchasers" in viola-
tion of Rule 10b-5. 48 Thus, the disclose or abstain rule is based on a
policy of fairness to public investors.
2. Texas Gulf Sulphur: Clarifying the Disclose or Abstain Rule
In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,49 the Second Circuit followed the
SEC's fairness approach of Cady, Roberts, stating that the purpose of
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is "to prevent inequitable and unfairprac-
tices and to insure fairness in securities transactions generally, whether
conducted face-to-face, over the counter, or on exchanges."50 The
Second Circuit further explained:
The core of Rule 10b-5 is the implementation of the Congres-
sional purpose that all investors should have equal access to the re-
wards of participation in securities transactions. It was the intent of
Congress that all members of the investing public should be subject
to identical market risks,-which market risks include, of course the
risk that one's evaluative capacity or one's capital available to put at
risk may exceed another's capacity or capital.51
Based on these policy considerations, the Second Circuit asserted its
own version of the Cady, Roberts disclose or abstain rule:
[A]nyone in possession of material inside information must either
disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclos-
ing it in order to protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses not
to do so, must abstain from trading in or recommending the securi-
ties concerned while such inside information remains
undisclosed.52
Texas Gulf Sulphur modifies or clarifies Cady, Roberts in several respects.
First, the Texas Gulf Sulphur rule expands the scope of section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 to reach any participant, not just corporate insiders as
47 Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 911.
48 IL at 913 (emphasis added).
49 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
50 Id. at 848 (emphasis added).
51 Id. at 851-52 (emphasis added). The Second Circuit also stated, "The only regula-
tory objective is that access to material information be enjoyed equally...." Id. at 849 (empha-
sis added).
52 Id. at 848.
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the first prong of Cady, Roberts suggests. 53 Second, unlike Cady, Rob-
erts, the Texas Gulf Sulphur rule extends the disclose or abstain prohibi-
tion beyond trades to recommendations based on inside information.
Third, Texas Gulf Sulphur defines inside information as material if its
disclosure is "reasonably certain to have a substantial effect on the
market price of the security,"54 following Cady, Roberts and Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 161 (b).55 Furthermore, Texas Gulf Sulphur indi-
cates that although the insider has no duty "to confer upon outside
investors the benefit of his superior financial or other expert analysis
by disclosing his educated guesses or predictions,"5 6 he must disclose
the "basic facts so that outsiders may draw upon their own evaluative
expertise in reaching their own investment decisions with knowledge
equal to that of the insiders."5 7 Again, the Second Circuit's language
recalls the common law contract principles of fraudulent misrepresen-
tation. Section 161(b) states:
A party may... reasonably expect the other to take normal steps to
inform himself and to draw his own conclusions. If the other is in-
dolent, inexperienced or ignorant, or if his judgment is bad or he
lacks access to adequate information, his adversary is not generally
expected to compensate for these deficiencies.58
3. A Comparison of the Fairness Theories
The theories arising from the fairness approach-as Table 1 dis-
plays-are consistent with the common law fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion principles in Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 161 (b). All three
fairness notions generally agree that deception occurs when the
trader fails to disclose information that is both material to the transac-
tion and unknown to his or her counterparts. Each fairness theory,
however, differs slightly from the common law doctrine. The Cady,
Roberts rule generally reaches insiders and thus imposes an obligation
to disclose corporate information. The Texas GulfSulphurrule is more
53 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. While the SEC noted in Cady, Roberts that
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 reach "any person," it nonetheless recognized its task as
"identify[ing] those persons who are in a special relationship with a company and privy to
its internal affairs." Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912.
54 401 F.2d at 848 (quoting Arthur Fleischer, Jr., Securities Trading and Corporate Infor-
mation Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulfur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REv. 1271, 1289
(1965) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Supreme Court later adopted its own
materiality test. See infra note 317.
The Second Circuit further stated that disclosure of material information must occur
"in a manner sufficient to insure its availibility [sic] to the investing public." Texas Gulf
Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 854.
55 See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
56 Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848.
57 Id at 849.
58 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAIcrs § 161 cmt. d (1981).
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expansive: it extends liability to anyone, and it imposes an obligation
to disclose nonpublic information.
The insider trading theories also deviate from the common law
rule in that the trader must disclose the information publicly and not
merely to the other parties. This difference exists because securities
exchanges involve impersonal transactions, and the transacting par-
ties are not easy to identify, especially in transactions involving pro-
spective buyers.59 There is some indication that Rule 10b-5 originally
sought to protect sellers, but courts and the SEC have extended it to
protect buyers as well.60 According to Cady, Roberts:
There is no valid reason why persons who purchase stock from an
officer, director or other person having the responsibilities of an
"insider" should not have the same protection afforded by disclo-
sure of special information as persons who sell stock to them.
Whatever distinctions may have existed at common law based on the
view that an officer or director may stand in a fiduciary relationship
to existing stockholders from whom he purchases but not to mem-
bers of the public to whom he sells, it is dearly not appropriate to
introduce these into the broader anti-fraud concepts embodied in
the securities acts.61
For the Second Circuit, these antifraud provisions of section 10(b)
and Rule 101-5 should embrace a broad fairness approach rather than
a narrower common law fiduciary approach.
Whether it is appropriate to base insider trading law on common
law fraudulent misrepresentation doctrine, however, is unclear. This
fairness approach may not properly address the insider trading prob-
lem. Fraudulent misrepresentation typically applies to a private
breach-of-contract action involving a face-to-face transaction with a re-
scission remedy; insider trading is a statutory, criminal violation in-
volving an impersonal transaction through a public securities
exchange.62 On the other hand, if section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 "are
broad remedial provisions aimed at reaching misleading or deceptive
activities, whether or not they are precisely and technically sufficient
59 See Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (Mass. 1933) (indicating that it would be
difficult for insiders to seek out the other actual party to the transaction for disclosure).
60 See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 913 (1961) ("Although the primary
function of Rule lOb-5 was to extend a remedy to a defrauded seller, the courts and this
Commission have held that it is also applicable to a defrauded buyer.").
61 Id. at 913-14.
62 It is not entirely apparent that application of common law contract principles to
insider trading is appropriate. See Goodwin, 186 N.E. at 661 (stating that principles applica-
ble to face-to-face transactions are not applicable to "commonly impersonal affairs");
Dooley, supra note 29, at 59 (arguing that insider trading does not involve reliance);
Langevoort, supra note 10, at 7-8 (arguing that although reliance on nondisclosure is ap-
parent in face-to-face transactions, it is less obvious in impersonal market transactions).
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TABLE I
A COMPARISON OF THE FAImss THEORIS
Duty owed to Reason for
Theory Deception Trader's duty whom? duty
Restatement of Nondisclosure Disclose mate- Party to the Duty of good
Contracts (fraudulent rial informa- transaction faith and fair
§ 161(b) misrepresenta- tion unknown dealing
tion doctrine) to other party
Cady, Roberts Nondisclosure Disclose mate- Market Fairness con-
(applies to in- rial informa- siderations
siders) don for a
corporate
purpose
Texas Gulf Nondisclosure Disclose mate- Market Fairness con-
Sulphur rial, nonpublic siderations
(applies to information
anyone)
to sustain a common law action for fraud and deceit, '63 then looking
to the common law fraudulent misrepresentation doctrine as a basis
for insider trading liability may be appropriate.
The SEC and the Second Circuit decided that section 10(b) sus-
tained the fairness approach. As the next Part of this Note reveals,
however, the Supreme Court adopted a liability theory based on the
notion of fiduciary relationships. The Court rejected a theory based
on section 161 (b) considerations thus changing the landscape of in-
sider trading jurisprudence.
II
ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF INSIDER
TRADING THEORY
Unlike the SEC and the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court de-
termined that the statutory requirements of section 10(b) do not sus-
tain the fairness approach to insider trading liability. By construing
section 10(b) narrowly, the Court excused trading that some had con-
sidered illegal. This narrow construction led to proposals of numer-
ous new insider trading theories, which attempt to reach trading that
the fairness approach once prohibited. This Part discusses the evolu-
tion of insider trading jurisprudence prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in O'Hagan.
63 Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 910.
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A. Chiarella: Rejection of the Fairness Approach
1. The Classical Theory
The Supreme Court first addressed section 10(b)'s role in insider
trading liability in Chiarella v. United States.64 In Chiarella, the defen-
dant, a financial printer employee, received documents of corporate
takeover bids from the client corporation. 65 The defendant deduced
the encoded names of target companies on the documents and
purchased their stock.66 The Supreme Court determined that the is-
sue "concerns the legal effect of the petitioner's silence" and whether
a pretrading duty to disclose had arisen.67 The Court held that the
federal securities laws do not reach the defendant's conduct because
"a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere posses-
sion of nonpublic market information. s68 It rejected the fairness ap-
proach of Cady, Roberts and Texas Gulf Sulphur, noting that "neither
the Congress nor the Commission ever has adopted a parity-of-infor-
mation rule."69
The Court then laid the framework for what later became the
"classical theory" of insider trading.70 It adopted a narrow construc-
tion of the deception requirement of section 10(b). The Court as-
serted that what section 10(b) catches "must be fraud' and that
"[w]hen an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there can
be no fraud absent a duty to speak."7' It articulated this section 10(b)
obligation by quoting the fraudulent nondisclosure doctrine of Re-
statement (Second) of Torts § 551(2) (a): "[T]he duty to disclose arises
when one party has information 'that the other [party] is entitled to
know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and con-
fidence between them.' ' 72 Thus, this more limited liability theory de-
rives from an insider's fiduciary relationship with the transacting
shareholders.73 The Court noted that this application of fraudulent
64 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
65 See id. at 224.
66 See id
67 Id. at 226.
68 Id. at 235.
69 IrM at 233. According to the Court:
We cannot affirm petitioner's conviction without recognizing a general
duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo actions based
on material, nonpublic information. Formulation of such a broad duty,
which departs radically from the established doctrine that duty arises from
a specific relationship between two parties, should not be undertaken ab-
sent some explicit evidence of congressional intent.
Id. (citation omitted).
70 United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1997).
71 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235 (emphasis added).
72 Id at 228 (second alteration in original) (quoting RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF
ToRTs § 551(2) (a) (1976)).
73 See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
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nondisclosure prevents the breach of fiduciary duty because it "guar-
antees that corporate insiders, who have an obligation to place the
shareholder's welfare before their own, will not benefit personally
through fraudulent use of material, nonpublic information." 74 The
classical theory could not reach the defendant in Chiarella because he
was a "complete stranger" to the shareholders and thus owed no duty
to disclose.75
2. ChiefJustice Burger's and Justice Stevens's Theories of
Misappropriation
In Chiarella, the Government argued for an alternative theory of
liability, suggesting that the defendant had committed fraud against
both (1) the client corporation whose information he had obtained
through his employment and (2) the target shareholders with whom
he had traded securities upon that information. 76 The Court de-
clined to address the Government's theory because the Government
did not present it to thejury.77 The trial judge instructed that the jury
could convict on a violation of section 10(b) if it merely found that
the defendant had failed to disclose material, nonpublic information
in connection with securities trading.78 Consequently, the jury only
decided whether the defendant had owed a duty to the transacting
shareholders, but not whether he had owed a duty to anyone else. 79
In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger disagreed with the majority's
narrow scope of the section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 obligation, arguing
"that a person who has misappropriated nonpublic information has
an absolute duty to disclose that information or to refrain from trad-
ing."80 He asserted that the fraudulent nondisclosure doctrine should
include a disclosure requirement "when an informational advantage is
obtained, not by superior experience, foresight, or industry, but by
some unlawful means."81 To support his reasoning, ChiefJustice Bur-
ger cited Professor Keeton's proposal that "[a] ny time information is
74 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230.
75 Id. at 232-33 ("He was not their agent, he was not a fiduciary, he was not a person in
whom the sellers had placed their trust and confidence. He was, in fact, a complete stran-
ger who dealt with the sellers only through impersonal market transactions.").
76 See id. at 235-36.
77 See i& at 236-37 ("Because we cannot affirm a criminal conviction on the basis of a
theory not presented to the jury, we will not speculate upon whether such a duty exists,
whether it has been breached, or whether such a breach constitutes a violation of § 10(b)."
(citations omitted)).
78 See id. at 236.
79 See id
80 Id at 240 (Burger, GJ., dissenting).
81 Id (Burger, GJ., dissenting).
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acquired by an illegal act it would seem that there should be a duty to
disclose that information."8 2
While the Chief Justice recognized a duty to the shareholders
under Rule 10b-5, Justice Stevens, in his concurrence, recognized a
duty to the employer and to the client corporation-the sources of
information-independent of the securities laws.88 Justice Stevens ar-
gued that the defendant "unquestionably owed [a duty of silence] to
his employer and his employer's customers," but he queried as to
whether a breach of such duty "could give rise to criminal liability
under rule 10b-5." 84 This "duty of silence"8 5 is similar to the duty of
loyalty that Restatement (Second) of Agency § 395 articulates:
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to the princi-
pal not to use or to communicate information confidentially given
him by the principal or acquired by him during the course of or on
account of his agency or in violation of his duties as agent, in com-
petition with or to the injury of the principal, on his own account or
on behalf of another, although such information does not relate to
the transaction in which he is then employed, unless the informa-
tion is matter of general knowledge.8 6
The defendant's breach of this fiduciary duty may have violated sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, according to Justice Stevens, because of
the "fraud or deceit" the defendant perpetrated on the sources of in-
formation "in connection with" securities trading.87 Chief Justice Bur-
ger may have given the theory its name, but the lower courts endorsed
Justice Stevens's fraud-on-the-source theory88  and subsequently
coined it the misappropriation theory.89
3. The Access to Information Theory
In dissent, Justice Blackmun argued that the Court could find a
section 10(b) violation without resorting to a misappropriation the-
82 Id. (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (quoting W. Page Keeton, Fraud-Concealment and
Non-Disclosure, 15 TEx. L. REv. 1, 25-26 (1936) (typeface altered)).
83 See id. at 237-38 (Stevens, J., concurring).
84 Id. at 238 (Stevens, J., concurring).
85 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
86 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958).
87 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 238 (Stevens, J., concurring). On the other hand, Justice
Stevens noted, this breach may not violate section 10(b) because the sources of informa-
tion were neither purchasers nor sellers of securities. See ic Thus, the sources whom the
defendant arguably defrauded would not be able to recover in a private action under Rule
lOb-5. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
88 It is important to note that while Justice Stevens suggested that misappropriation
may violate Rule 10b-5, he did not assert that it necessarily did. Because O'Iagan eventu-
ally takes the position that misappropriation indeed constitutes a securities law violation,
however, this Note refers to this position as Justice Stevens's theory.
89 See infra Part ll.D.
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ory.90 In response to ChiefJustice Burger's and Justice Stevens's mis-
appropriation theories, Justice Blackmun stated that he would find
the defendant's conduct illegal "even if he had obtained the blessing
of his employer's principals."91 He contended that such trading "with
or without such approval lies close to the heart of what the securities
laws are intended to prohibit. '92 Justice Blackmun would have held
"that persons having access to confidential material information that
is not legally available to others generally are prohibited by Rule 10b-5
from engaging in schemes to exploit their structural informational ad-
vantage through trading in affected securities."93 His dissent echoes
Professor Victor Brudney's proposed "access to information" theory,94
to which Justice Blackmun cites.95 Under Professor Brudney's access
to information theory, section 10(b) prohibits an informed investor
from trading on material information that he knows is not legally at-
tainable, by his trading counterparts. 96 Professor Brudney's theory is
not dissimilar to the fairness approaches of Cady, Roberts and Texas
Gulf Sulphur.97
4. Rule 14e-3(a)
Four months after the Supreme Court decided Chiarella, the SEC
promulgated Rule 14e-3(a) 98 pursuant to section 14(e) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act.99 Rule 14e-3(a) prohibits securities trading on ma-
90 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 245 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
91 Id. at 246 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
92 Id (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Interestingly, Justice Blackmun's
dissent in Chiarella foreshadowsJustice Thomas's dissent in O'Hagan 17 years later. See infra
notes 248-51 and accompanying text.
93 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 251 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
94 See Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 93 HARv. L. Rxv. 322, 353-67 (1979). Professor Brudney's theory in turn is
reminiscent of Texas Gulf Sulphur, which states that Rule lOb-5 "is based in policy on the
justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors trading on imper-
sonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material information." SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (emphasis added).
95 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 251-52 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
96 See Brudney, supra note 94, at 354-55.
97 The equal access approach has not attracted the same judicial attention as the mis-
appropriation theory. "[N]evertheless, it has been subject to some academic criticism.
Law and economics scholars have argued that access can always be purchased in some way;
one could, for example, devote one's life to becoming a corporate director and thus have
the same legal access to corporate information." Dalley, supra note 12, at 1334.
98 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1998). See generally ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CASES AND
MAT'ERLUS ON CORPOarIONs 860-61 (6th ed. 1998) (describing the history and scope of
Rule 14e-3(a)).
99 Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1994)). Section 14(e) states in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person.., to engage in any fraudulent, decep-
tive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer
.... The [SEC] shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by rules and
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terial, nonpublic information regarding a tender offer,100 regardless
of whether the trader breaches a fiduciary duty.'0 1, Thus, the rule
would reach any future conduct similar to that in Chiarella. The SEC
promulgated Rule 14e-3 (a) to make it easier to establish a prima facie
case against misappropriators whose fiduciary relationship or duty is
difficult to prove.102 Some suggest that the SEC wished to prohibit
conduct even when there is no breach of fiduciary duty. s03 Thus, at
least in the tender offer context, insider trading law returned to the
pre-Chiarella fairness approach by criminalizing all trading on mate-
rial, nonpublic information.
5. A Comparison of the Theories Surrounding Chiarella
The Supreme Court's decision in Chiarella generated numerous
insider trading theories and an SEC rule, as Table 2 depicts. The ba-
ses of these insider trading theories range from fraudulent misrepre-
sentation principles of Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 161 (b) to the
fraudulent nondisclosure doctrine of Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 551(2) (a) to duty of loyalty principles of the Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 395. At one end of this spectrum lies the SEC-promulgated
regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent,
such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994). Pursuant to its rule-making authority, the SEC promulgated
Rule 14e-3(a), which states:
If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or has
commenced, a tender offer (the "offering person"), it shall constitute a
fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act or practice within the meaning of
section 14(e) of the Act for any other person who is in possession of mate-
rial information relating to such tender offer which information he knows
or has reason to know is nonpublic and which he knows or has reason to
know has been acquired directly or indirectly from:
(1) The offering person,
(2) The issuer of the securities sought or to be sought by such tender
offer, or
(3) Any officer, director, partner or employee or any other person act-
ing on behalf of the offering person or such issuer, to purchase or sell or
cause to be purchased or sold any of such securities or ... any option or
right to obtain or to dispose of any of the foregoing securities, unless within
a reasonable time prior to any purchase or sale such information and its
source are publicly disclosed by press release or otherwise.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a).
100 See id.
101 See, e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 557 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc)
(asserting that Rule 14e-3(a) "creates a duty ... to abstain or disclose, without regard to
whether the trader owes a pre-existing fiduciary duty").
102 See, e.g., SEC v. Peters, 978 F.2d 1162, 1167 (10th Cir. 1992) (indicating that in a
tender offer context, a breach of fiduciary duty is "almost impossible to prove").
103 See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 695 (1997) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (stating that this wish "exceeds the scope
of the [SEC]'s authority").
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Rule 14e-3 (a); at the other end is Justice Stevens's misappropriation
theory.104
Rule 14e-3 (a), applicable only in the context of tender offers, ap-
pears to derive from the pre-Chiarella fairness approach.1°5 Conse-
quently, it probably finds deception in the nondisclosure of material,
nonpublic information. Furthermore, the mere possession of this ma-
terial, nonpublic information triggers the trader's duty to disclose this
information to the market. The access to information theory, which
Justice Blackmun and Professor Brudney endorse, states that decep-
tion occurs when the trader fails to disclose unattainable material in-
formation. The trader's duty to disclose arises because the public
does not have access to this information. The classical theory also
finds deception in the nondisclosure of material, nonpublic informa-
tion. The trader's duty to disclose to the market arises because the
trader is in a fiduciary or similar relationship with the uninformed
shareholders. 10 6 Chief Justice Burger's theory finds deception in the
nondisclosure of nonpublic, misappropriated information. The
trader's duty to disclose to the market arises because he possesses mis-
appropriated information. Justice Stevens's theory does not discuss
liability in the same terms as the aforementioned insider trading theo-
ries. Instead of a duty to disclose information to the market, the
trader or potential trader has a fiduciary duty to refrain from misap-
propriation of the principal's information through securities trading.
6. State of the Law After Chiarella
The classical theory, the law after Chiarella, derives from Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 551(2) (a). Section 551(2) (a) doctrine in turn
derives from fiduciary relationships, and its application to insider trad-
ing encounters several problems. The Supreme Court seemingly re-
104 One commentator pointed out that from a different perspective these opposite
poles may not be so dissimilar:
To the extent that the only people who have unequal access are people who
receive information that is protected legally (and so cannot be acquired by
others at any price), the access theory will cover the same cases covered by
the misappropriation theory, except to the extent that a trader with permis-
sion from her employer is covered by the equal access rule but not the
misappropriation theory. Additionally, because the equal access rule is
based on the public's lawful access to the information in question, it is
closely related to property-based rules ....
Dalley, supra note 12, at 1334-35 (footnote omitted).
105 See supra Part I.B.
106 See Barbara Bader Aldave, Misappropriation: A General Theory of Liability for Trading on
Nonpublic Information, 13 HomsrsA L. REv. 101, 104 (1984). "The basis of the rule that a
fiduciary duty creates an obligation of full disclosure appears to be that, at least in face-to-
face dealings, one who has reposed trust and confidence in another is entitled to assume
the nonexistence of material facts that the other does not reveal." Id.
1374 [Vol. 84:1356
INS1DER TRADING JUJSPRUDENCE
TABLE 2
A COMPARISON OF INSIDER TRADING THEORIES AFTER Chiarella
Duty owed to Reason for
Theory Deception Trader's duty whom? duty
Rule 14e-3(a) Nondisclosure Disclose mate- Market Possession of
(applicable under Restate- rial, nonpublic material, non-
only in tender ment of Con- information public informa-
offer contexts) tracts § 161(b) don
Blackmun's Nondisclosure Disclose unat- Market Fairness:
and Brudney's under Restate- tainable mate- Counterparty
access theory ment of Con- rial informa- has no access
tracts § 161(b) tion to information
Classical theory Nondisclosure Disclose mate- Market Fiduciaries in a
under Restate- rial, nonpublic transaction
ment of Torts information
§ 551(2) (a)
Burger's theory Nondisclosure Disclose non- Market Trading on
under Keeton's public, misap- misappropriat-
proposal propriated in- ed information
formation
Stevens's mis- No deception Disclosure Principal(s)- Duty of loyalty
appropriation [Breach of fi- insufficient; Source(s) of
theory duciary duty must obtain information
under Restate- consent
ment of Agency
§ 395]
solved one of these problems; the others are dormant, but they
reappear in the misappropriation context.10 7
One implicit clarification that Chiarella makes is that the classical
theory embraces the Cady, Roberts notion that section 10(b) protects
both buyers and sellers of securities. Presumably, a liability theory
based on section 551(2) (a) generally protects only sellers because
they are shareholders and thus fiduciaries. 10 8 Buyers, unless they are
already shareholders, are merely prospective shareholders and thus are
not typically considered fiduciaries of the corporate insider. 10 9 In a
footnote, however, Chiarella indicates that the classical theory protects
buyers and sellers alike, quotingJudge Learned Hand's remarks cited
in Cady, Roberts.
[T]he director or officer assumed a fiduciary relation to the buyer
by the very sale; for it would be a sorry distinction to allow him to
use the advantage of his position to induces the buyer into the posi-
107 See infra Part IV.B.2.
108 See Pritchard, supra note 12, at 26 (stating that the common law doctrine "generally
extends only to current shareholders," not "to prospective shareholders who ... purchase
their shares for the first time"). "The classical theory fails to account adequately for this
inconsistency with the common law." Id.
109 See id.
1999] 1375
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
tion of a beneficiary although he was forbidden to do so once the
buyer had become one. 110
Chiarella's "selective" reliance on the common law § 551(2) (a) doc-
trine has been criticized."' As one commentator noted, "The distinc-
tion between the insider who sells and the insider who buys may well
be a 'sorry' one, but it is a natural consequence of a theory which
premises liability on a preexisting relationship between the trading
parties.""12
Another consequence of the classical theory's focus on a fiduciary
relationship is that the nebulous definition of "fiduciary" creates sev-
eral potential problems for insider trading law. First, federal law regu-
lates securities transactions, but state law defines fiduciary
relationships, and thus, the classical theory may not apply uni-
formly.'1 3 For example, the majority view in early common law stated
that corporate officers were not fiduciaries of their shareholders. 114
Second, if what constitutes a "fiduciary" is unclear, what constitutes a
"similar relation of trust and confidence" 1 5 is even less clear. Third,
enforcement of criminal liability with an imprecise rule raises consti-
tutional concerns. 1 6 These problems are not so serious in the classi-
cal context because Chiarella reaches only company insiders. These
problems indeed emerge, however, when the courts attempt to extend
liability to outsiders.
110 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 n.8 (1980); 40 S.E.C. 907, 914 n.23
(1961) (quoting Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1951) (opinion of Hand, J.)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
111 See Pritchard, supra note 12, at 26-27.
112 Aldave, supra note 106, at 108.
113 See infra notes 308-10 and accompanying text.
114 See Dalley supra note 12, at 1298-1302. Another commentator noted that the law
did not always regard insiders as fiduciaries of their shareholders:
Indeed, the majority common law rule was that directors and other insiders
owed a fiduciary duty to their corporation, but not to its shareholders, and
that such insiders could trade in the corporation's securities without full
disclosure. Only a minority ofjurisdictions insisted that an insider owed a
fiduciary duty to their corporation and its shareholders, and required the
insider to disclose all material facts in connection with his purchases of the
company's securities. The Supreme Court, in an early case, adopted the
intermediate position that "special facts" could create a duty of disclosure.
Aldave, supra note 106, at 104-05 (footnotes omitted). The implied shareholder reliance
on the fiduciary insider, however, may by illusory: "In the ordinary case, ... it is probably
entirely fictional to say that a shareholder reposes trust and confidence in a director, of-
ficer, or controlling shareholder of a corporation." Id. at 105.
115 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS § 551(2) (a) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
116 See Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) ("It is a basic principle of due
process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly de-
fined."); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 77 (1976) ("Due process requires that a
criminal statute provide adequate notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that his con-
templated conduct is illegal.. ").
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B. Dirks. "Tippee" Liability Theories
1. The SEC's and the Court's Theories
Because the Supreme Court narrowly construed section 10(b) in
Chiarella, the scope of the classical theory did not reach the defendant
in Dirks v. SEC.117 In Dirks, the defendant, an investment analyst, was
not a corporate insider. He thus owed no fiduciary duty to the share-
holders, even though he received nonpublic, corporate information
from insiders in the course of his employment." 8 The defendant
alerted investor clients about the possibility that a particular corpora-
tion's fraudulent practices had resulted in an overvalued stock
price.119 The stock price soon fell drastically.120 The SEC brought
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 charges against the defendant under a
tippee liability theory.12 1 The SEC's tippee liability theory stated that
when a tippee knowingly receives material, nonpublic information
from an insider, the tippee inherits the insider's fiduciary duty to dis-
close before trading.122
The Supreme Court did not accept the SEC's theory, stating that
it is similar to the fairness approach that the Court had rejected in
Chiarella.'2 3 The Court reaffirmed Chiarella's assertion that "[a] duty
[to disclose] arises from the relationship between parties... and not
merely from one's ability to acquire information because of his posi-
tion in the market."'124 It also recognized that the SEC's theory may
impose an unreasonable restriction on market analysts: "Imposing a
duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person knowingly receives
material nonpublic information from an insider and trades on it
could have an inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts,
which the SEC itself recognizes is necessary to the preservation of a
healthy market.' u25
117 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
118 See id. at 648-49.
119 See id. at 649-50.
120 See id. at 650.
121 See id. at 650-51.
122 See id. at 655-56. The SEC stated that "[w]here 'tippees'-regardless of their moti-
vation or occupation-come into possession of material 'corporate information that they
know is confidential and know or should know came from a corporate insider,' they must
either publicly disclose that information or refrain from trading." In re Dirks, Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 17480 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 n.12 (footnote
omitted)), reprinted in 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1407 (1981).
123 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 656.
124 ML at 657-68 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231-32, n.14 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (alterations in original)).
125 Id. at 658. The Court continued:
It is commonplace for analysts to ferret out and analyze information, and
this often is done by meeting with and questioning corporate officers and
others who are insiders. And information that the analysts obtain normally
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In rejecting the SEC's tippee theory, the Court nonetheless real-
ized that "[t]he need for a ban on some tippee trading is clear."x26
The Court reasoned, "Not only are insiders forbidden by their fiduci-
ary relationship from personally using undisclosed corporate informa-
tion to their advantage, but they also may not give such information to
an outsider for the same improper purpose of exploiting the informa-
tion for their personal gain."'127 The Court then developed its own
tippee liability theory:
[A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corpo-
ration not to trade on material nonpublic information only when
the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by
disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or
should know that there has been a breach. 128
In distinguishing its tippee theory from the SEC's, the Court ex-
plained that "some tippees must assume an insider's duty to the share-
holders not because they receive inside information, but rather
because it has been made available to them improperly."'129 The Court
also indicated that the insider breaches a fiduciary duty only when he
benefits at the expense of the shareholders. 130 Thus, the tippee the-
ory also has a personal benefit test. Under this test, the Court deter-
mines "whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or
indirectly, from his disclosure. Absent some personal gain, there has
been no breach of duty to stockholders. And absent a breach by the
insider, there is no derivative breach.'' l
In footnote fourteen, the Court also suggested that section 10(b)
liability may reach tippees even when the tipping insider commits no
fiduciary breach.'3 2 When the insider conveys inside information to
independent contractors who hold a fiduciary duty to the corpora-
tion, these "temporary insiders" assume section 10(b) obligations. 133
The Court reasoned:
Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate informa-
tion is revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer,
may be the basis for judgments as to the market worth of a corporation's
securities.
IM. at 658-59 (citation and footnote omitted); see also id. at 658 n.18 ("The SEC's rule-
applicable without regard to any breach by an insider-could have serious ramifications on
reporting by analysts of investment views.").
126 Id. at 659.
127 &L
128 Id. at 660.
129 Id.
130 See id. at 661-64.
131 Id. at 662. Whether the tipper receives a benefit depends upon an examination of
the objective facts and circumstances. See id at 663-64.
132 See id, at 655 n.14.
133 Weiss, supra note 12, at 415.
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or consultant working for the corporation, these outsiders may be-
come fiduciaries of the shareholders. The basis for recognizing this
fiduciary duty is not simply that such persons acquired nonpublic
corporate information, but rather that they have entered into a spe-
cial confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of the
enterprise and are given access to information solely for corporate
purposes.1 34
The last clause of this passage from Dirks is reminiscent of the first
element of the Cady, Roberts rule: "[A] relationship giving access, di-
rectly or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a
corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone." 135
Although the Court suggested in Chiarella and Dirks that the classical
and tippee liability theories are consistent with Cady, Roberts, these
Supreme Court opinions reject the basis for the SEC decision.'3 6
Thus, there is a noticeable tension as Dirks attempts to reconcile its
tippee liability theory with the classical theory and the theory of Cady,
Roberts.
2. A Comparison of Tippee Theories
In Dirks, the theory that the SEC proposed, the theory that the
Court eventually adopted, and the language of footnote fourteen each
would impose liability if the trading tippee fails to disclose material,
nonpublic information to the market. The theories differ, however,
in how those duties to disclose arise. As Table 3 indicates, the SEC
theory imposes a section 10(b) obligation if the tippee knows that the
tipper is a fiduciary of the shareholders-if the tipper is an insider.
Under Dirks, the tippee only has this obligation if he knows that the
insider, in disclosing information to him, breached a fiduciary duty to
the shareholders. Footnote fourteen of Dirks indicates that if the tip-
per does not breach a fiduciary duty, the tippee still may have this
obligation if he himself is in a "special confidential relationship" to
the tipper or his company.
3. Dirks in Light of Chiarella
From Dirks, two strange notions emerge: (1) the element of fidu-
ciary breach with respect to insider trading and (2) the concern for
legitimate conveyance or use of confidential information. The lan-
guage of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 does not mention the words
"fiduciary" or "breach," nor does it discuss the conveyance or use of
confidential information. Although Chiarella merely alludes to those
ideas, Dirks centralizes them in insider trading theory.
134 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.14.
135 In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
136 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 653-54; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226-27 & n.8.
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TABLE 3
A COMPARISON OF TIPPEE TiHiEOPuis IN Dirks
Duty owed to Reason for
Theory Deception Trader's duty whom? duty
Proposed SEC Nondisclosure Disclose mate- Market Knowledge
theory based on rial, nonpublic that tipper is a
Restatement of information fiduciary of
Torts shareholders
§ 551(2) (a)
Dirks theory Nondisclosure Disclose mate- Market Knowledge of
rial, nonpublic tipper's fiduci-
information ary breach in
tipping
Dirks footnote Nondisclosure Disclose mate- Market Tippee is a fi-
14 rial, nonpublic duciary of the
information tipper's compa-
ny
In Chiarella, the Supreme Court relied on Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 551 (2) (a),137 which states that nondisclosure of material facts
in a transaction between fiduciaries constitutes fraud.38 To suggest
that the Chiarella Court based its holding on a breach of fiduciary
duty, however, is misleading. Rather, the Chiarella Court concluded
that section 10(b) only reaches fraud, that fraud only can arise in in-
sider trading if there is an unlawful nondisclosure of material facts,
that unlawful nondisclosure arises only if there is a duty to disclose,
and that a duty to disclose arises in a business transaction between
fiduciaries.'39 There is a distinction between a breach of fiduciary
duty and fraud. A breach of fiduciary duty occurs when an insider
benefits at the expense of the company's shareholders. Fraud under
section 551(2) (a) occurs when the insider enters into a transaction
with a shareholder, and despite their fiduciary relationship, the in-
sider fails to disclose material information. Confusion may arise be-
cause classical insider trading constitutes both a breach of fiduciary
duty and a fraud under section 551(2) (a).140
Indeed, the Dirks Court inaccurately embraced the notion of a
breach of fiduciary duty rather than the notion of section 551 (2) (a)
nondisclosure between transacting fiduciaries. The Court then ex-
tended this fiduciary obligation to a nontransacting party-the tippee.
Under the Dirks tippee theory, a tippee may not trade on his tip if he
knows that the tipper-insider breached a fiduciary duty to the share-
137 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
138 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 551 (2) (a) (1976).
139 See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
140 In other words, the section 551(2) (a) duty to disclose also ensures that the insider
does not breach his fiduciary responsibility to the shareholders. See supra text accompany-
ing note 74.
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holders.141 However, the Court failed to explain adequately how a
nonfiduciary tippee inherits a "derivative" fiduciary duty to the share-
holders from the tipper's breach.142 It merely imposed on the tippee
the strange duty of disclosing to the shareholders inside information
that belongs not to them or to the tipping insider but to the corporate
principal.143
Had the Dirks Court instead adopted the proposed SEC theory,
which embraces Chiarella's section 551(2) (a) perspective, the Court
would still lack a solid legal framework to reach tippee trading. The
section 551(2) (a) characterization of this conduct is that the tipper
engages in insider trading through a "straw," and "no man should be
permitted to do indirectly what he would be forbidden to do di-
rectly."' 44 This reasoning indicates that the proposed SEC approach
imposes liability on the tipper, not on the tippee who actually
trades. 145 Thus, it is questionable whether the Court could satisfacto-
141 See supra note 128 and accompanying text. The tipper's breach consists of (1) a tip
conveying material, nonpublic information, (2) a tippee's trading on the tip, which injures
the shareholders, and (3) the insider's receiving a benefit as a result of the tip. See supra
text accompanying notes 126-31.
It is questionable whether the personal benefit test is necessary. First, that an insider
receives a benefit may be difficult to prove, especially if that benefit is intangible or if the
insider received it in the past or will receive it in the future. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S.
646, 676 n.13 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the defendant received a
benefit of "enhanced reputation"). Second, the fact that the information an insider tips
may yield substantial profits is enough to presume that he has received some benefit. See
id. Third, whether a section 10(b) violation has occurred should not hinge on whether the
insider has received a benefit. See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 12, at 435 ("[W]hether the tipper
receives a personal benefit has no clear relationship to the notion of deceit."); Betsy
Palmer Collins, Recent Decision, Dirks v. SEC: Tipping Congress Toward the Federalization of
Corporation Law?, 36 ALk. L. REv. 297, 300, 319 (1984) ("This 'personal benefit' test means
that it may be possible to breach a state fiduciary duty and yet not be liable under rule lOb-
5."). Fourth, the shareholder suffers injury from the tippee's trading whether or not the
tipping insider receives a benefit or not. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 673-74 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
142 SeeAldave, supra note 106, at 109 ("Precisely how a breach by the insider creates the
requisite fiduciary duty on the part of the tippee is unclear."); Pritchard, supra note 12, at
27 ("[T]ransformation of the tipper's breach of his duty of confidentiality owed to the
corporation into a breach by the tippee of a duty of disclosure to shareholders is hard[ ] to
accept.").
The only relationship that insider trading law recognized after Chiarella was the fiduci-
ary relationship between the insider and the shareholder. Because, under the Dirksliability
theory, it is the insiderwho benefits at the expense of the shareholder, it is hard to see how
the tippee is liable if he has no obligation to the shareholder.
143 See Dooley, supra note 29, at 32 ("The corporate principal owns the information
and may withhold it so long as withholding serves a valid corporate purpose.").
144 Bird v. Holbrook, 130 Eng. Rep. 911, 917 (C.P. 1828) (opinion of Burrough, J.).
145 Whether tipping without tippee trading constitutes a section 10(b) violation is
questionable. The Second Circuit in Texas Gulf Sulphur construed section 10(b) as prohib-
iting insiders from recommending stocks. See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d
Cir. 1968) (en banc). Disclosure alone, however, arguably affects the market only when it
dissuades a would-be investor from trading. Policing mere disclosure of inside information
is problematic because it is difficult, first, to identify would-be traders and then to deter-
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rily reach the tippee given the existing framework of insider trading
law.
Not only did the Dirks Court fail to present a clear theory to pro-
hibit tippee trading,1 46 it also aided the acceptance of the misappro-
priation theory by focusing on the illegitimate communication of
information in breach of fiduciary duty. The disclosure of confiden-
tial corporate information (regardless of the benefit to the insider or
injury to the shareholder) is thought of more as a breach of a duty
owed to the corporation rather than the shareholders. 4 7 This charac-
terization of tipping as a breach of fiduciary duty to the source of the
information is the essence of the misappropriation theory.
C. Carpenter Mail and Wire Fraud in Insider Trading
1. The Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes and Insider Trading
In Carpenter v. United States,148 the Court had another opportunity
to expand insider trading liability under section 10(b). In Carpenter, a
journalist and several investors entered into a trading scheme
designed to exploit the journalist's receipt of nonpublic informa-
tion. 149 The journalist regularly interviewed corporate executives for
his Wall Street Journal column, which discussed positive and negative
information about selected stocks.150 Due to the nature of the col-
umn's information, it had the potential of affecting the market value
of any stocks that it discussed.15 1 In several instances prior to the pub-
lication of his column, the journalist conveyed this information to in-
mine from whom they received the tip. See Collins, supra note 141, at 300 ("At one point
during extensive deliberations, Congress considered a bill that would have regulated the
tipping of nonpublic information by insiders. The legislators deleted this provision from
the 1934 Act, however, apparently because they thought it to be unenforceable.").
Although a would-be investor benefits from receiving tips, refraining from trading seems
not as egregious as buying when one was about to sell, selling short when one was about to
buy, or otherwise actively exploiting this informational advantage.
146 See Weiss, supra note 12, at 415 (observing that "Dirks ... was, in doctrinal terms,
even more enigmatic than Chiarella" (footnote omitted)).
147 See Pritchard, supra note 12, at 27; Weiss, supra note 12, at 416. After all, the confi-
dential information belongs to the corporation. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
The rule that the Dirks court expressed in footnote 14 indicates that hired account-
ants, lawyers, and consultants who receive corporate information legitimately may become
fiduciaries of the shareholders. But these hired tippees are almost certainly fiduciaries of
the corporation. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.13 (1998) (indicating
that lawyers may disclose confidential information received from the client organization
only to "duly authorized constituents"). Thus, both insiders and "temporary insiders"
probably have a duty to the corporation to use confidential information for the benefit of
the corporation. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCy § 395 (1998).
148 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
149 See i&i at 23.
150 See id. at 22.
151 See id. at 22-23.
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vestors, who then traded securities accordingly. 52 While none of the
columns at issue contained information that the firms deemed confi-
dential, the Wall Street Journal considered confidential all information
that the journalist acquired prior to publication. 153 The Government
charged the defendants with violating section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,
as well as the federal mail and wire fraud statutes.154 The district
court 15 5 and the Second Circuit 156 determined that the defendants
had violated section 10(b) under the misappropriation theory. The
Supreme Court divided four-to-four on the question of whether the
defendants had incurred section 10(b) liability when they victimized
the Wall StreetJournal-a party that was indifferent toward the transac-
tions at issue.157 Thus, the Court did not adopt the misappropriation
theory when it affirmed the section 10(b) conviction. 158
The Supreme Court, however, unanimously affirmed the mail
and wire fraud convictions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343.159 Ac-
cording to the Court, the reporter's information constituted property
for the purposes of the statutes, and "[t]he Uourna] had a property
right in keeping confidential and making exclusive use" of this infor-
mation. 160 The Court construed the phrase "to defraud" in the mail
fraud statute as "wronging one in his property rights by dishonest
152 See ida t 23.
153 See id. at 22-23.
154 See id- at 20-21.
155 See United States v. Winans, 612 F. Supp. 827, 849-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part sub nom. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), afTd,
484 U.S. 19 (1987).
156 See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1034.
157 See Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 24 ("[T]he newspaper [was] the only alleged victim of
fraud and ha[d] no interest in the securities traded." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
158 See id.
159 See id. at 25-28. In pertinent part, section 1341 states:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice
to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudu-
lent pretenses, representations, or promises... places in any post office or
authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be
sent or delivered by the Postal Service... or takes or receives therefrom...
shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30
years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994). In pertinent part, section 1343 states:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice
to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudu-
lent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be trans-
mitted by means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or
foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the
purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined.., not more
than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994).
160 Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 26.
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methods or schemes."' 61 The Court also applied this reading to lan-
guage in the wire fraud statute because the language is the same in
both statutes.162 Consequently, it held that the defendants' conspir-
acy had defrauded the Journal of the right to exclusive use of its prop-
erty.163 Quoting Grin v. Shine,'64 the Court asserted that such fraud is
akin to "embezzlement, which is 'the fraudulent appropriation to
one's own use of the money or goods entrusted to one's care by
another.'"165
In support of the notion of information property rights, the
Court quoted Diamond v. Oreamuno:166
It is well established, as a general proposition, that a person who
acquires special knowledge or information by virtue of a confiden-
tial or fiduciary relationship with another is not free to exploit that
knowledge or information for his own personal benefit but must
account to his principal for any profits derived therefrom. 167
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 388 displays similar language, which
provides that "[u] nless otherwise agreed, an agent who makes a profit
in connection with transaction conducted by him on behalf of the
principal is under a duty to give such profit to the principal."168
2. The Rules of Liability in Carpenter
The rules of liability discussed in Carpenter-as Table 4 displays-
are similar to Justice Stevens's theory of misappropriation, but are sig-
nificantly different from the other prior theories. While the classical,
tippee, and fairness theories govern transactions, the rules discussed
in Carpenter govern principal-agent relationships. Under the Grin rule
of fraud, an agent's embezzlement of the principal's property consti-
tutes a fraudulent deprivation of the use of a good. This conversion
of property is unlawful unless the agent obtains the principal's permis-
sion. Under the Carpenter rule, an analogous fraud occurs when an
agent profits from entrusted confidential information, thereby depriv-
ing the principal of exclusive use of a good. Again, the agent only
may use the information for personal benefit if he obtains the princi-
pal's permission. Under the rule articulated in Restatement (Second) of
161 Id. at 27 (quoting McNaly v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358 (1987) (quoting
Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924) (internal quotation marks
omitted))).
162 See id. at 25 n.6.
163 See id. at 28.
164 187 U.S. 181 (1902).
165 Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 27 (quoting Grin, 187 U.S. at 189 (second internal quotation
marks omitted)).
166 248 N.E.2d 910 (N.Y. 1969).
167 Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 27-28 (quoting Diamond, 248 N.E.2d at 912 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
168 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 388 (1958).
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Agency § 388, however, there is no specific provision against fraud or
deception, just one that addresses the breach of fiduciary duty when
an agent fails to give profits from a transaction that the agent con-
ducted on behalf of the principal. The agent may keep the profits if
he obtains the principal's permission.
TABLE 4
A COMPARISON OF LIABILITY RuLs rN Carpenter
Duty owed to Reason for
Rule Deception Duty whom? duty
Rule of fraud Fraudulent Obtain consent Principal(s) Deprivation of
in Gfin deprivation of [Disclosure is good consti-
use of good insufficient] tutes embezzle-
ment or fraud
Rule of fraud Deprivation of Obtain consent Principal(s)- Deprivation of
in Carpenter exclusive use of [Disclosure is Source(s) of exclusive use of
information insufficient] information information is
like embezzle-
ment or fraud
Restatement None [Agent Obtain consent Principal(s) Agent owes
(Second) of profits in trans- or account for principal(s) a
Agency § 388 action conduct- profits [Disclo- duty of loyalty
ed on behalf sure is insuffi-
of principal(s)] cient]
3. The Species of Fraud in Carpenter
Carpenter's determination that an agent's appropriation of the
principal's information constitutes fraud is questionable. First, the Di-
amond court did not mention "fraud" in the principal-agent con-
text,169 and the Restatement (Second) of Agency only discusses the breach
of a duty of loyalty. Whether a breach of a duty of loyalty constitutes
fraudulent conduct is unclear. Second, the Court's analogy of appro-
priation of information in Carpenter to embezzlement in Grin is a poor
fit. The act of embezzling denies the principal's complete use of its
property, causing obvious injury to the principal. On the other hand,
information appropriation denies only the principal's exclusive use of
this property, and thus, injury to the principal is less apparent.170
o Although Carpenter did not contribute directly to the expansion
of securities law to insider trading, it is significant in other respects.
First, it demonstrates that the Dirks tippee liability theory is limited.
Had the Dirks duty-oriented tippee theory instead resembled the pro-
posed SEC theory, Carpenter may have been an easier case. Under the
169 The Diamond court did indicate that a Rule 10b-5 violation may have occurred but
only because the defendants' conduct may have defrauded the transacting shareholders. See
Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E. 2d 910 (N.Y. 1969).
170 See Painter et al., supra note 12, at 182.
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proposed SEC theory, section 10(b) would prohibit tippees from trad-
ing on material, nonpublic information if they know or should know
that the tip came directly or indirectly from a fiduciary of the share-
holders.171 The Court simply would have to decide whether the infor-
mation is material and nonpublic.172 The Dirks theory looks to
whether tippers breach their fiduciary duties in tipping. Since there
was no breach of fiduciary duty in Carpenter, the Dirks theory did not
reach the tippees. Consequently, the Court had to find yet another
means of reaching what looked like insider trading conduct.
Second and perhaps more importantly, Carpenter perpetuates ju-
dicial scrutiny of securities information transfers, thereby facilitating
acceptance of the misappropriation theory. In Carpenter, the Court
expanded the definition of "fraud" under the mail and wire fraud stat-
utes to include misappropriation of information. The Court cited the
Restatement (Second) of Agency, 173 yet left unclear why a violation of
agency law also necessarily constituted fraud. Thus, Carpenter sets the
stage for the adoption of misappropriation theory as the next logical
step in the expansion of insider trading liability.
D. Circuits Divided on the Misappropriation Theory
Before O'Hagan, several circuits had already adopted the misap-
propriation theory into their insider trading law. The Second, Sev-
enth, and Ninth Circuits endorsed the misappropriation theory, while
the Fourth stood alone in opposition.'74 When O'Hagan came before
the Eighth Circuit, itjoined the Fourth in opposing the application of
the misappropriation theory.175 Although the Third Circuit may have
adopted the misappropriation theory in dicta, it did not address the
171 See supra Part II.B.1.
172 Although few would perceive the information as typical "inside information"-con-
fidential corporate information-one still may characterize it as material and nonpublic.
The information in Carpenter may be material because it consists of "influential recommen-
dations by analysts." Dalley, supra note 12, at 1310. The information also may be nonpub-
lic because it was leaked prior to publication. See ida Trading on this information is known
as "scalping." ML
173 See Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 28.
174 See United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 944 (4th Cir. 1995) ("We conclude that
neither the language of section 10(b), Rule 10b-5, the Supreme Court authority interpret-
ing these provisions, nor the purposes of these securities fraud prohibitions, will support
convictions resting on the particular theory of misappropriation adopted by our sister
circuits.").
175 See United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 620 (8th Cir. 1996) ("We find the analy-
sis from Bryan persuasive and have borrowed heavily from it in arriving at our conclusion.
Therefore, we adopt that court's analysis in its entirety as our own."), re,'d, 521 U.S. 642
(1997).
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theory by name. 7 6 This left the circuits divided three-to-two concern-
ing the expansion of section 10(b) via the misappropriation theory. 77
1. The Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits
In United States v. Newman,178 the Second Circuit became the first
to adopt the misappropriation theory. In Newman, the Second Circuit
asserted that the misappropriator's breach of duty fulfilled the decep-
tion requirement of section 10(b). 179 It dismissed the issue of decep-
tion rather quickly, stating that
[i]n other areas of the law, deceitful misappropriation of confiden-
tial information by a fiduciary, whether described as theft, conver-
sion, or breach of trust, has consistently been held to be unlawful.
[It] would... be most ingenuous to believe that Congress intended
to establish a less rigorous code of conduct under the Securities
Acts.' 80
The Newman court also found that the misappropriator's conduct met
the "in connection with" requirement because the purpose of the mis-
appropriation was to use the information in securities trading. 18 '
While it refrained from doing so in Newman, the Second Circuit justi-
fied the application of the misappropriation theory in United States v.
176 See Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818, 822 (3d Cir. 1985) ("An insider on
either side of a proposed transaction violates the insider trading rule when he uses insider
information in violation of the fiduciary duty owed to the corporation to which he owes a
duty of confidentiality.").
177 The circuits divided three-to-one on the validity of Rule 14e-3(a). The Second,
Seventh, and Tenth Circuits included Rule 14e-3(a) in the evolution of insider trading. See
SECv. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 635 (7th Cir. 1995); SECv. Peters, 978 F.2d 1162, 1165 (10th Cir.
1992); United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 563 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc). The Eighth
Circuit, however, declined to recognize the validity of Rule 14e-3(a). See United States v.
O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 627 (8th Cir. 1996), revd, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
178 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
179 See id at 16.
180 Id. at 18 (citations omitted). A subsequent congressional report on insider trading
quoted this statement of Newman. See H.R. REP. No. 98-355, at 5 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2278.
In SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), the Second Circuit also suggested that
the principal suffers injury from the misappropriation. See id. at 202. A misappropriator
jeopardizes the principal's "reputation as a safe repository for client secrets," thereby un-
dermining its integrity. Id. The Second Circuit also quoted RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF
AGENCY § 395, stating that "an agent is subject to a duty to the principal not to use or to
communicate information confidentially given to him by the principal or acquired by him
during the course of or on account of his agency." Id. at n.4 (quoting RESTATEmENT (SEC.
oND) oF AGENCY § 395 (1958) (misciting as § 359) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
181 See Newman, 664 F.2d at 18. In Materia, the Second Circuit presented a more reso-
lute statement about the connection requirement: "The information [the misap-
propriator stole has no value whatsoever except 'in connection with' his subsequent
purchase of securities. The fraud perpetrated on his employer was part and parcel of a
larger design, the sole purpose of which was to reap instant no-risk profits in the stock
market." Materia, 745 F.2d at 203.
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Materia8 2 on the basis that this theory furthered the policy of the se-
curities laws. 183 The Materia court stated, 'We do not believe the
drafters of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934-envisaging as they
did an open and honest market-would have countenanced the activi-
ties engaged in by [the defendant] ."184
In SEC v. Clark,'8 5 the Ninth Circuit became the next to approve
of the misappropriation theory. In Clark, the court found that the
misappropriation theory meets the section 10(b) "deception" and "in
connection with" requirements, and that it effectuates the underlying
policies. 186 First,. the Ninth Circuit stated that the misappropriation'
theory reaches the Carpenter definition of fraud because it prohibits
the use of confidential information in the breach of a fiduciary
duty.' 87 The court concluded that Carpenters analysis of the mail and
wire fraud statutes applies to section 10(b) because the statutes con-
tain similar language.'8 8 Second, the Ninth Circuit asserted that the
misappropriator's conduct was "in connection with" trading, reason-
ing that his "sole purpose in obtaining the nonpublic information...
was to make a fast buck by trading in .. . securities."' 89 Third, the
court indicated that legislative history and congressional action
support the adoption of the misappropriation theory.190 The Ninth
Circuit pointed to general language in the legislative history prohibit-
ing "manipulative or deceptive practices."' 9 1 It also relied on reports
accompanying the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA) 19 2
and the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act
of 1988 (ITSFEA) 193 in making its decision.' 9 4 Neither of these
statutes codifies the misappropriation theory; however, they do
expand insider trading liability, 195 and their accompanying reports
182 745 F.2d 197, 203-04 (2d Cir. 1984).
183 See id.
184 Id.
185 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990).
186 See id. at 449.
187 See id.
188 See id& at 448.
189 Id. at 449.
190 See id. at 450.
191 ML (quoting S. REP. No. 73-792, at 18 (1934) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
192 Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
193 Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.).
194 See Clark, 915 F.2d at 452.
195 Under ITSA, Congress codified section 20(d) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78t(d) (1994), prohibiting an individual from trading options on material, non-
public information when trading on the underlying securities is illegal. See id.
Under ITSFEA, Congress enacted section 20A of the Securities Exchange Act, id.
§ 78t-1, providing civil remedies to victims of insider trading. Section 20A states in relevant
part:
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generally approve of a theory based on information mis-
appropriation. 196
In SEC v. Cherif,197 the Seventh Circuit followed suit and adopted
the misappropriation theory.198 In Cherif, the Seventh Circuit likewise
discussed whether the theory comports with the section 10(b) require-
ments and policy. The court suggested that the misappropriation the-
ory fulfills the "deception" requirement because the theory reaches
more than mere thievery.' 99 A misappropriator betrays a trust: he
uses information belonging to the principal, which the misap-
propriator gains only through a fiduciary relationship. 200 His actions
are fraudulent "because they deprived some person of something of
value by 'trick, deceit, chicane or overreaching."' 20 1 The Seventh Cir-
Any person who violates any provision of this chapter or the rules or
regulations thereunder by purchasing or selling a security while in posses-
sion of material, nonpublic information shall be liable in an action in any
court of competent jurisdiction to any person who, contemporaneously
with the purchase or sale of securities that is the subject of such violation,
has purchased (where such violation is based on a sale of securities) or sold
(where such violation is based on a purchase of securities) securities of the
same class.
Id. § 78t-1 (a).
196 The report accompanying ITSA suggests that the antifraud provisions may prohibit
the illegal use of information when one converts it for personal benefit in breach of a
fiduciary duty.
Since its creation, the [SEC] has appropriately used the antifraud provi-
sions to remedy unlawful trading and tipping by persons in a variety of posi-
tions of trust and confidence who have illegally acquired or illegally used
material non-public [sic] information.
For example, in certain widely-publicized instances, agents of
tender offerors and persons contemplating a merger or acquisition have
used for personal gain information entrusted to them solely for a business
purpose. Such conversion for personal gain of information lawfully ob-
tained abuses relationships of trust and confidence and is no less reprehen-
sible than the outright theft of nonpublic information.
H.1L REP. No. 98-355, at 4-5 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2277-78.
The report accompanying ITSFEA indicates that the misappropriation theory upholds
the underlying policy of the Securities Exchange Act:
[T]he codification of a right of action for contemporaneous traders is spe-
cifically intended to overturn court cases which have precluded recovery for
plaintiffs where the defendant's violation is premised upon the misappro-
priation theory. The Committee believes that this result is inconsistent with
the remedial purposes of the Exchange Act, and that the misappropriation
theory fulfills appropriate regulatory objectives in determining when com-
municating or trading while in possession of material nonpublic informa-
tion is unlawful.
H.R REP. No. 100-910, at 26-27 (1988) (citation omitted), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6043, 6063-64.
197 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
198 See id. at 410.
199 See id. at 412.
200 See i
201 Id (quoting McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358 (1987)). The court also
noted "[the] common sense notion of fraud" that underlies the misappropriation theory
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cuit did not substantively discuss the "in connection with" require-
ment, stating only that trading securities "in connection with"
deception violates section 10(b). 20 2 As for the policy underlying sec-
tion 10(b), the Seventh Circuit, like the Ninth Circuit, cited congres-
sional reports suggesting general approval of the misappropriation
theory.20 3
2. The Central Bank Decision
The Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank v. First Interstate
Bank204 represents a turning point for circuit court decisions regard-
ing the misappropriation theory. In Central Bank, the Court held that
one cannot maintain a private action for damages against a person
who aided and abetted a section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violation. 20 5 In
dicta, the Court stated that it would not expand the reading of section
10(b), suggesting that this interpretation would not sustain the broad
misappropriation theory. The Court reaffirmed its narrow construc-
tion of Chiarella, asserting that section 10(b) "prohibits only the mak-
ing of a material misstatement (or omission) or the commission of a
manipulative act."2 06 It also stated that a nondisclosure of material,
nonpublic information violates section 10(b) only when there is "an
independent duty of disclosure." 20 7 The Court further opined that
"aiding and abetting a wrongdoer ought to be actionable in certain
instances," but that the issue "is not whether imposing private civil
liability on aiders and abettors is good policy but whether aiding and
abetting is covered by the statute."208 Thus, the Supreme Court indi-
cated that it would not impose liability under the misappropriation
theory if the theory is based on the underlying policy of the statute
and not its language.
[Bly becoming part of a fiduciary or similar relationship, an individual is
implicitly stating that she will not divulge or use to her own advantage infor-
mation entrusted to her in the utmost confidence. She deceives the other
party by playing the role of the trustworthy employee or agent; she defrauds
it by actually using the stolen information to its detriment.
Id. at 410 (alteration in original) (quoting SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 448 (9th Cir. 1990)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
202 Id. ("We agree that buying or selling securities 'in connection with' fraud perpe-
trated on an employer to obtain material non-public information constitutes a violation of
Rule lob-5.").
203 See id. n.5.
204 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
205 See id. at 191.
206 IR. at 177.
207 Id- at 174. This assertion, however, slightly mischaracterizes the holding. In
Chiarella, the Court held that mere possession of materiai nonpublic information does not
give rise to a duty to disclose. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980). But
it did not address whether this duty arises from possession of information basic to the trans-
action, and it did not explicitly reject the "basic facts" doctrine. See infra notes 316-18.
208 Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 177.
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3. The Fourth and Eighth Circuits
In United States v. Bryan,20 9 the Fourth Circuit rejected the misap-
propriation theory, determining that it does not fulfill the "deception"
and "in connection with" requirements of section 10(b). 210 First, the
Fourth Circuit invoked the Supreme Court's construction of section
10(b) in Santa Fe Industries v. Green,21l contending that the fiduciary
breach element of the misappropriation theory does not constitute
deception under the Statute. 212 In Santa Fe, the Court stated that sec-
tion 10(b) reaches acts specifically involving deceit but does not reach
mere breach of fiduciary duty without deception. 213 Second, the
Fourth Circuit argued that the breach is not "in connection with" the
securities trading. According to the Fourth Circuit, the misappropria-
tion theory "artificially divides into two discrete requirements-a fidu-
ciary breach and a purchase or sale of securities-the single
indivisible requirement of deception upon the purchaser or seller of
securities, or upon some other person intimately linked with or af-
fected by a securities transaction."214 When the Eighth Circuit en-
countered the misappropriation theory in United States v. O'Hagan,215
it fully endorsed the ruling of the Fourth Circuit in Bryan.216 Using
the same reasoning, the Eighth Circuit held that section 10(b) cannot
sustain the misappropriation theory.217 It also held that Rule 14e-3 (a)
exceeds the SEC's rule-making authority because it dispenses with the
breach-of-fiduciary-duty requirement.218
Ill
UMzTED STA zSV. 0 :HA aW
A. Facts
DefendantJames H. O'Hagan, a partner at the law firm of Dorsey
& Whitney, received confidential information regarding a possible
tender offer by the firm's client Grand Met for the target company
Pillsbury Madison.219 O'Hagan did no work for Grand Met,220 but
209 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
210 See ia at 944.
211 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
212 See Bryan, 58 F.3d at 949.
213 See Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 476.
214 Bryan, 58 F.3d at 950. The Fourth Circuit seemingly embraced the RESrATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2) (a) perspective. Cf supra note 175 and accompanying text.
215 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
216 See supra note 175.
217 See O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 622.
218 See id. at 627.
219 See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647-48 (1997).
220 See i&. at 647.
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received this information through the law firm.2 2 ' He purchased Pills-
bury securities prior to the tender offer and then sold the securities
once Grand Met publicly announced its tender offer earning a profit
of over $4.3 million on the transaction. 222
O'Hagan was arrested and charged with fifty-seven counts of se-
curities fraud under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and
Rule lOb-5, fraudulent trading under section 14(e) of the Act and
Rule 14e-3(a), federal mail and wire fraud, and money laundering.223
In the district court, a jury convicted O'Hagan on all counts.2 24 On
appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed all of O'Hagan's convictions. 225
The Government appealed, 226 and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.227
B. Recharacterization of the Misappropriation Theory
In light of Central Bank, Bryan, and its own defeat in the Eighth
Circuit, the Government confronted two main hurdles in arguing for
the adoption of the misappropriation theory: it had to establish that
the theory meets both the "deception" requirement and the "in con-
nection with" requirement of section 10(b). 2 28 Consequently, in its
briefs and in oral argument, the Government carefully recharacter-
ized the misappropriation theory to fulfill these requirements. 229
The Government advocated an expanded construction of section
10(b)'s "deception" requirement. Under the Court's interpretation
in Chiarella, section 10(b) reaches common law fraud under the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts § 551(2) (a) doctrine-nondisclosure in a
transaction between fiduciaries.230 The Government argued that "the
securities laws are not framed to pick up only those violations that are
covered by common law fraud," but a range of "deceptive devices."'23 '
221 See id. at 648 & n.1.
222 See id. at 647-48.
223 See id at 648-49.
224 See id at 649.
225 See United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 614 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 521 U.S. 642
(1997).
226 The Government allowed the Eighth Circuit's reversal of O'Hagan's money laun-
dering convictions to stand. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 678 n.24.
227 See United States v. O'Hagan, 519 U.S. 1087 (1997).
228 See Pritchard, supra note 12, at 37. The Government also had to defend the misap-
propriation theory agalnsf the defendant's arguments on these issues. See Brief for Respon-
dent at 12-33, United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (No. 96-842).
229 The Court's opinion in O'Hagan frequently cites the Government's brief, and at
least one commentator believes that the oral argument may have decided the case for the
Government. See, e.g., Pritchard, supra note 12, at 41.
230 See supra Part II.A.
231 Transcript of Oral Argument at *7, O'Hagan (No. 96-842), available in 1997 WL
182584.
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This reading of section 10(b), argued the Government, allows for
the adoption of the misappropriation theory.232 The theory does not
reach common law fraud, but it does prohibit the Carpenter species of
fraud. According to the Government, a violation of section 10(b) oc-
curs when "a trusted agent defrauds the legitimate owner of the right
of exclusive use of its information and reaps illicit profits by employ-
ing the information in securities trading."233 Citing Carpenter, the
Government noted that when "an unfaithful agent maintains a pre-
tense of loyalty to the principal while secretly converting the princi-
pal's information for personal gain," this conversion is a "species of
fraud" and meets the section 10(b) "deception" requirement. 23 4
The Government also suggested that the section 10(b) "in con-
nection with" requirement does not necessarily mean that the decep-
tion must occur between parties to the transaction, as Bryan asserts
and as Chiarella and Dirks imply:
Congress did not pass a law even that said that it is unlawful to
commit fraud in a securities transaction. It passed a law with a
broader phrase, in connection with a securities transaction, because
the very aim of this section was to pick up unforeseen, cunning,
deceptive devices that people might cleverly use in the securities
markets[.] 235
The Government argued that the misappropriation theory meets the
"in connection with" requirement of section 10(b) because the misap-
propriator only can realize the value of inside information in the se-
curities market.236 Thus, a misappropriator's deceptive breach and
his trading are connected-the trade consummates the breach.23 7
The Government further expressed valid policy reasons for
adopting the misappropriation theory. It argued that "investors do
232 See id. at *6-8
233 Brief for the United States at 15, O'Hagan (No. 96-842). In its Reply Brief, the
government elaborated on how the misappropriation theory fulfills the "deception"
requirement:
[Lliability under the misappropriation theory is premised on the fact that
the particular breach of duty involved in the conversion of confidential in-
formation that has been entrusted to one for a limited purpose inherently
involves deception. Thus, under well settled principles, before an agent
may use his principal's confidential business information for his personal
benefit, he must make disclosure to the principal and obtain the principal's
consent; the breach of that duty thus inherently involves deceptive
nondisclosure.
Reply Brief for the United States at 6, O'Hagan (No. 96-842).
234 Brief for the United States at 17.
235 Transcript of Oral Argument at *7.
236 See Reply Brief for the United States at 11 (arguing that nonpublic information has
"no value" to the misappropriator "except as it might enable him to reap windfall profits in
the securities market (or enable someone else to reap such profits, through illegal
tipping)").
237 See id.
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assume that they are not trading with someone who acquired the in-
formational advantage simply by fraud, simply by stealing information
in breach of a fiduciary duty and using it for trading."238 Thus, by
advocating a broader definition of deception, by asserting that infor-
mation misappropriation constitutes a species of fraud, by demon-
strating the connection between the deception and the securities
trading, and by showing how the theory comports with the underlying
policy, the Government bolstered its argument for the adoption of the
misappropriation theory.
C. The Decision
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit and remanded
for further proceedings. 23 9 A six-to-three majority held that section
10(b) and Rule IOb-5 liability may be predicated on the misappropria-
tion theory.240 Under the misappropriation theory, an individual vio-
lates the statute when he trades securities on the entrusted
information of his fiduciary while feigning loyalty to the fiduciary.2 41
The majority stated that this theory complies with the statutory lan-
guage and purpose of section 10(b) and that the theory is consistent
with established section 10(b) jurisprudence.2 42
Dissenting from this part of the opinion, Justice Scalia asserted
that the Court should have invoked the principle of lenity.2 43 This
principle compels a court to interpret ambiguity in a criminal statute
in the light most favorable to the defendant.244 Justice Scalia argued
that the reading most favorable to the defendant suggests that a sec-
tion 10(b) violation occurs only when the trader deceives his transact-
ing counterpart, not a third party. 245
Justice Thomas, along with Chief Justice Rehnquist, also dis-
sented from the Court's ruling on the misappropriation theory.246
238 Transcript of Oral Argument at *26.
239 See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 678 (1997); see also United States v.
O'Hagan, 139 F.3d 641, 645 (8th Cir. 1998) (affirming O'Hagan's securities fraud and
mail fraud convictions and remanding to the district court for resentencing).
240 See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 650.
241 See id. at 653-54.
242 See id at 649-66. The Court declined to address whether Chief Justice Burger's
theory of misappropriation in Chiarela similarly compiled with section 10(b). The Court
indicated that the Government did not propose the former ChiefJustice's theory. See id. at
655 n.6. However, the North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc.
(NASAA) Brief indicated that Chief Justice Burger's theory was the sounder theory and
suggested that the Court adopt it. See infra note 282.
243 See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 679 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
244 See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) ("[W] here there is ambiguity in a
criminal statute, doubts are resolved in favor of the defendant.").
245 See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 679 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
246 See id. at 680 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
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Thomas argued that the adopted version of the theory "fails to pro-
vide a coherent and consistent interpretation" of section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5. 2 47 He asserted that the misappropriation theory does not
meet the "in connection with" requirement, nor does it comport with
the underlying policy of the securities laws.2 48
The Court also reversed the Eighth Circuit with respect to the
section 14(e) and Rule 14e-3(a) convictions and the mail and wire
fraud convictions. A seven-to-two majority held that Rule 14e-3(a) is a
valid exercise of the SEC's authority against O'Hagan.2 49 Justice
Thomas and ChiefJustice Rehnquist dissented, asserting that the SEC
had exceeded its rule-making authority under section 10(b) when it
promulgated 14e-3 (a). 250 The Court unanimously upheld O'Hagan's
mail and wire fraud convictions.251
IV
ANALYSIS OF T=E MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
This Part discusses the merits of the misappropriation theory of
O'Hagan in light of the Court's majority and minority opinions.
Although the majority asserted that the misappropriation theory
meets section 10(b)'s "deception" and "in connection with" require-
ments, that it comports with the Act's market integrity policy, and that
it is consistent with prior case law, this Part argues that the misappro-
priation theory not only fails in each instance, but also is cumbersome
to apply.
A. The Statutory Requirements and the Misappropriation
Theory
Analysis of the misappropriation theory must begin with the lan-
guage of section 10(b).2 52 According to the language of the statute, a
violation of section 10(b) occurs when an individual uses a "deceptive
device" "in connection with" securities trading.253 In O'Hagan, the
"deception" and "in connection with" requirements are major points
247 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
248 See id at 680-92 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
249 See id at 666-67.
250 See id. at 694-95 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
251 See id. at 678.
252 "The starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language
itself." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
253 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
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of contention in reconciling the misappropriation theory with judicial
interpretation of section 10(b).254
1. The Deception Requirement
The majority asserted that the misappropriation theory fulfills
section 10(b)'s "deception" requirement. 255 According to the major-
ity, "A fiduciary who '[pretends] loyalty to the principal while secretly
converting the principal's information for personal gain,'. . . defrauds
the principal."256 Justice Thomas, who ultimately dissented from the
adoption of the misappropriation theory, also agreed with the major-
ity's ruling that a fiduciary's misappropriation of confidential informa-
tion constitutes a "deceptive device" under section 10(b). 257 The
resolution of this issue, however, is not so clear.
The majority's reading of the statutory language in O'Hagan con-
stitutes a significant departure from the Court's prior construction of
section 10(b). In Chiarella, the Court interpreted the deception ele-
ment of section 10 (b) to reach only fraud.2 58 Such a narrow construc-
tion cannot sustain the misappropriation theory, however, because an
undisclosed breach of a duty of loyalty does not fit under the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 551(2) definition of fraud.259 Section 551(2)
recognizes fraudulent disclosure between transacting fiduciaries. 260 In
the misappropriation context, the fiduciary relationship exists outside
the transaction. Thus, to apply the misappropriation theory in
O'Hagan the majority had to expand the definition of deception
under section 10(b) to reach the species of fraud in Carpenter-the
misappropriation of entrusted information, a breach of a duty of loy-
alty.2 61 As noted above, however, Carpenter's application of mail and
wire fraud to the securities laws is suspect because it is not clear that
254 See Brief for Respondent, O'Hagan (No. 96-842).
255 See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653.
256 Id at 653-54 (first alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Brief for the
United States at 17).
257 See id at 680 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
258 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
259 Section 551 is the relevant fraud doctrine because Chiarella interprets insider trad-
ing as an act of fraudulent nondisclosure in a transaction. See supra notes 67, 72 and ac-
companying text.
One commentator suggests, however, that deception under section 551(2) (a) and de-
ception under the misappropriation theory are not all that different: "In reality, corporate
shareholders are no more deceived by an insider, temporary insider, or tippee's trades, at
least when they occur on a stock exchange or other impersonal market, than are the per-
sons from whom material, nonpublic information has been misappropriated." Weiss, supra
note 12, at 421.
260 For further discussion of nondisclosure liability under section 551 (2), see infra Part
V.261 See O'Haga7, 521 U.S. at 653-54.
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mere fiduciary breach constitutes fraud in light of Santa Fe262 or that
misappropriating information constitutes embezzlement-a species of
fraud.263
The deception that the majority found in O'Hagan was that the
misappropriator failed to disclose to the principal his intent to use
confidential information in trading. The argument that this nondis-
closure constitutes "deception" under section 10(b) fails for two rea-
sons. First, the disclosure of the agent's intent to misappropriate does
not necessarily prevent or cure the insider trading conduct (as it does
under the other theories). Notifying the source of the information
does not Prevent the trade, does not alert the transacting counterpar-
ties, and thus, does not protect innocent investors. 264 Consequently,
nondisclosure under the misappropriation theory does not constitute
"a material misrepresentation or material failure to disclose" that the
Court required in Santa Fe.265 Second, if the agent ever deceives the
principal as to his loyalty, it is when the principal unwittingly discloses
the information to a disloyal or potentially disloyal agent, not when
the agent manifests his disloyalty by trading.266 A principal probably
discloses confidential information to the agent on the belief that the
agent is and will remain loyal. A principal cannot later deprive the
agent of the information if the agent disavows his loyalty.2 67 If decep-
tion occurs prior to trading, then under the majority's interpretation
of the section 10(b), the misappropriator's conduct does not meet the
"in connection with" requirement.
Even if the Supreme Court's more expansive reading of section
10 (b) had'requiied merely a deceptive breach, and if a duty of loyalty
breach had constituted a statutory violation, the Court could have re-
considered the pre-Chiarella fairness approach before adopting the
misappropriation theory. Surely a breach of a contractual duty of
good-faith dealing under the fraudulent misrepresentation doctrine is
at least as deceptive as a breach of a duty of loyalty.268 The notion of
contractual misrepresentation also better addresses the policy under-
lying the Securities Exchange Act-the protection of uninformed
transacting parties. By focusing on a breach of a duty of loyalty, the
O'Hagan Court may have decided that it was easier to retract its statu-
262 See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
263 See supra Part II.C.3.
264 See infra notes 288-91 and accompanying text.
265 Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 (1977).
266 Cf O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 at 656 ("IT]he fiduciary's fraud is consummated, not
when the fiduciary gains the confidential information, but when, without disclosure to his
principal, he uses the information to purchase or sell securities.").
267 Cf Painter et al., supra note 12, at 182, 184 (arguing that because information is
both a public good and intangible, it is impossible to deprive one of information that one
has already acquired).
268 For a discussion of contractual fraudulent misrepresentation, see supra Part I.B.
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tory interpretation (that section 10(b) catches only fraud), which
formed the basis of its holding in Chiarella, rather than the holding
itself (that there is no duty of good-faith dealing between individuals
trading on a securities exchange).
2. The "In Connection With" Requirement
The majority's argument that the misappropriation theory fulfills
section 10(b)'s requirement of deception "in connection with" trad-
ing269 also is unconvincing. The majority noted that the language of
section 10(b) "does not confine its coverage to deception of a pur-
chaser or seller of securities; rather, the statute reaches any deceptive
device used 'in connection with the purchase or sale of any secur-
ity."' 2 70 According to the majority, the required "connection" be-
tween deception and trading exists under the misappropriation
theory when the two events coincide: "[T]he [misappropriator]'s
fraud is consummated.., when... he uses the [confidential] infor-
mation to purchase or sell securities."271 The majority contrasted in-
sider trading with embezzlement, stating that embezzling money to
fund trading does not fulfill the "in connection with" requirement be-
cause an individual completes the embezzlement prior to trading and
can use the money for other ends.2
72
Justice Thomas, however, asserted that the misappropriation the-
ory does not fulfill the "in connection with" requirement of section
10(b), suggesting that the majority's interpretation of the require-
ment is inconsistent.273 First, he attacked the majority's assertion that
fraud is "in connection with" trading because trading consummates
the breach of duty.274 In response to the majority's embezzlement
hypothetical, Justice Thomas offered his own hypothetical to demon-
strate how embezzlement may meet the majority's "in connection
with" requirement: "[In] an embezzlement.., via the mechanism of
a securities transaction . . . where a broker is directed to purchase
stock for a client and instead purchases such stock-using client
funds-for his own account[,] ... the 'securities transaction and the
breach of duty thus coincide."' 275
269 See O'Hagar4 521 U.S. at 655-56.
270 Id. at 651 (citation omitted).
271 d. at 656.
272 See id at 656-57.
273 See id. at 680-92 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
274 See id. at 680-85 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
275 Id. at 685 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(citations omitted). Thomas offered another hypothetical to demonstrate how tipping
consummates the fraud prior to trading. See id. at 686 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part). Thomas further pointed out that the statute
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In response to Justice Thomas, the majority argued that misap-
propriated information is connected more intimately to securities
trading than embezzled money because this information ordinarily
guides trading that seeks to capitalize on no-risk profits.27 6 Justice
Thomas in turn pointed out that the Government's proposed misap-
propriation theory claimed that the information assists only in securi-
ties trading.2 77 He argued that the Court lacked the authority to
modify this theory,278 and he then indicated other uses of misappro-
priated information.2 79
This exchange suggests that the majority analogized misappropri-
ation and embezzlement selectively. The majority implied that misap-
propriation is like the embezzlement of information, and because
embezzlement is fraud, misappropriation is fraud.280 After arguing
that the similarities prove that the misappropriation theory fulfills the
deception requirement, however, the Court distinguished misappro-
priation and embezzlement to qualify the "in connection with"
requirement.
In one sense the Court's intuition is correct: many regard insider
trading as trading on inside information, not as embezzlement-funded
trading.28' After all, embezzling does not affect the securities market.
But because the misappropriation theory can reach either conduct,
perhaps the Court should have realized the improper focus of the the-
ory. Insider trading theory, then, should target deceptive uses of in-,
side information in connection with trading. This information is
important not because it is ordinarily used in evaluating which securi-
ties to trade, but because it is nonpublic. The "inside-ness" of the infor-
mation is what makes the information notable.282
does not prohibit only the misappropriation of information; thus, there is no reason why,
under the accepted theory, section 10(b) would not prohibit the type of embezzlement in
Thomas's hypothetical. See id at 688 n.4 (ThomasJ, concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
276 See i&L at 657-58.
277 See id at 684 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
278 See id. at 687 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) ("It is a fundamental proposition of law that this Court may not supply a reasoned
basis for the agency's action that the agency itself has not given." (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983))).
279 See id. at 686 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part); see also id. at 657 n.8 (indicating other uses of misappropriated information).
280 See id. at 654.
281 See supra note 30.
282 See infra note 288 and accompanying text.
The amici brief of NASAA for the Petitioner endorsed Chief Justice Burger's theory.
See Brief of Amid Curiae North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc., and
Law Professors in Support of Petitioner at 12, O'Hagan (No. 96-842).
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B. Section 10(b) Policy and the Misappropriation Theory
At first blush, the misappropriation theory is appealing from a
policy standpoint because of its dual function: it prevents an individ-
ual from exploiting a fiduciary relationship by trading on confidential
information, and as a result, it indirectly protects the integrity of the
securities markets from fraudulent practices. 283 The theory shifts the
focus, however, of insider trading prohibition from tainted securities
transactions to tainted fiduciary relationships. Yet Congress enacted
the Securities Exchange Act to address the former and not the lat-
ter.284 A closer examination reveals that the misappropriation theory
In support of his theory in Chiarella, the Chief Justice cited Professor Keeton's
proposal:
[T]he way in which the buyer acquires the information which he conceals
from the vendor should be a material circumstance. The information
might have been acquired as the result of his bringing to bear a superior
knowledge, intelligence, skill or technicaljudgment; it might have been ac-
quired by mere chance; or it might have been acquired by means of some
tortious action on his part... Any time information is acquired by an illegal act
it would seem that there should be a duty to disclose that information.
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 240 (1980) (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (alterations
in original) (quoting Keeton, supra note 82, at 25-26 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Even if Chief Justice Burger's theory meets the "deception" and "in connection with" re-
quirements, however, it is not clear that a misappropriator inherits an obligation to the
shareholders. As one commentator stated:
There is virtually no authority for the view that a defendant who has unlaw-
fully obtained information, or improperly converted information to his own
use, is subject to an absolute duty to disclose it to those with whom he trans-
acts business. The only authority that the ChiefJustice cited in support of
his theory argued that "there should be a duty," not that there is a duty, to
disclose information that was acquired illegally.
Aldave, supra note 106, at 106.
283 As one amici brief stated:
When [a misappropriator] use[s] material nonpublic information ob-
tained in the course of a special relationship of trust and confidence to
trade securities for his personal benefit in breach of his fiduciary duties, he
injure[s] both the corporation whose secrets and plans had been entrusted
to him and his law firm, whose confidence he betrayed, and he under-
mine[s] the efficiency and integrity of the securities markets.
Brief of Amid Curiae North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc., and Law
Professors in Support of Petifitoner at 4-5, O'Hagan (No. 96-842).
If the market integrity purpose of the Act alone could support the misappropriation
theory, it also could support the fairness approach that Chiarella rejected. See Seligman,
supra note 12, at 18-19.
284 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. "Congress's purpose in enacting the stat-
ute... was to protect the integrity of securities markets, not to create a property right to
information." Brief of Amid Curiae Law Professors and Counsel in Support of Respondent
at 10, O'Hagan (No. 96-842). "Congress could develop a statutory definition of the pro-
scribed conduct based on a theory of property rights in information...." Id. at 28 (empha-
sis added). It seems improper, however, for the Court to construe a law which seeks to
protect public securities markets to govern private fiduciary relationships. For one com-
mentator's proposed property rights approach, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating
State Law Fidudary Duties into the Federal Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 WAsH. & LEE L. Rxv.
1189 (1995).
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not only fails to implement the purpose of the statute, but it also fails
to protect the integrity of fiduciary relationships.
1. Misappropriation Theory and Protection of Public Investors
In O'Hagan, the Supreme Court determined that the misappro-
priation theory fulfills the purpose of the Act by preventing deception
between fiduciaries in connection with trading.28 5 The majority
claimed that because the theory prohibits informational advantage
through contrivance rather than skill or luck, it thereby insures hon-
est securities markets.23 6 Justice Thomas, however, after arguing that
the misappropriation theory fails to meet section 10(b)'s require-
ments, stated that "it is not illegal to run afoul of the 'purpose' of a
statute, only its letter. '28 7 Even if the misappropriation theory fulfills
these requirements, Justice Thomas asserted, it fails to serve the un-
derlying policy of section 10(b). He claimed that the majority's en-
dorsement of the protection of fiduciary relationships that are
external to the trading "glosses over the fact that the supposed threat
to fair and honest markets, investor confidence, and market integrity
comes not from the supposed fraud [or information misappropria-
tion,] ... but from the mere fact that the information used by [the
defendant in trading] was nonpublic."288 He noted that if a source of
information were to grant authority to trade on confidential informa-
tion, then under the misappropriation theory an "outsider" legally
could exploit his informational advantage over the unwary investor
who "has no hope of obtaining [nonpublic information] through his
own diligence."28 9 Justice Thomas further stated, "As far as the mar-
ket is concerned, a trade based on confidential information is no
more 'honest' because some third party may know of it so long as
those on the other side of the trade remain in the dark."290 Thus, a
285 See O'-agan, 521 U.S. at 658-59.
286 See id.
287 Id. at 689 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
288 Id (ThomasJ, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Decep-
tion of the source may not have "anything to do with the confidence or integrity of the
market." IM at 691 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part); see also Brief of Amid Curiae Law Professors and Counsel in Support of Respondent at
21, O'Hagan (No. 96-842) ("[I]nsider trading liability turns not on effects on the market-
place or on potential damage to selling or purchasing shareholders, but rather on a duty
owed to the source of the information, regardless of whether that source is a buyer or seller
of securities or even a market participant at all.").
289 O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 689-90 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
290 Id. at 690 n.6 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part); see also Brief of Amid Curiae Law Professors and Counsel in Support of Respondent at
30, O'Hagan (No. 96-842) ("An investor who has paid too much for stock or sold it for too
little in a transaction with a person in possession of material nonpublic information suffers
loss irrespective of whether the counterparty breached a fiduciary duty to a third party.").
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trader gains his advantage through the use of nonpublic information,
whether or not he deceives the source in acquiring it.291
If the policy underlying the statute is to protect the fiduciary rela-
tionship, then the law should protect the relationship for its own sake,
notjust as a means to protect the securities markets. If the underlying
policy is to protect the integrity of the securities markets, then the law
explicitly should do so.292
2. Protection of Fiduciaries
The misappropriation theory not only fails to promote market
integrity by protecting fiduciary relationships, but in some cases it also
fails to protect the relationships themselves.293 This failure is espe-
cially apparent with respect to the misappropriation theory's disclo-
sure rule.
In the classical context, in which the insider possesses nonpublic
information about his company's securities, the duty to disclose seems
appropriate. Disclosure prevents the insider from exploiting his unin-
formed fiduciary shareholders, and under corporate law, it prevents
an officer from using corporate information personally to benefit at
the expense of these shareholders.2 94 In the misappropriation con-
text, however, the trader has no fiduciary relationship with these
shareholders and thus has no duty to disclose. To require the trader
Professor Coffee has asserted, however, that selective disclosure or permissive use of
inside information, though detrimental to the market, differs from insider trading:
[E]ven if selective disclosure impairs market efficiency and injures inves-
tors, there is a strong case for defining it to be a separate offense from
insider trading. Insider trading is, after all, criminally punishable by
sentences of up to 10 years, and there seems little reason to constantly ex-
pose pension and mutual fund managers to this threat on a virtually daily
basis because they might hear too much in an analyst conference call.
Coffee, supra note 11, at 5 (footnote omitted).
291 See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 690 n.7 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
The misappropriation theory's protection of fiduciary relationships derives from
agency law. See id. at 654-55 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 390, 395
(1958)). The problem is that insider trading probably does little, if any, harm to the
source. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Under the Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers, 19J. CORP. L. 1, 10-11 (1993) (indicating that insider trading has a minimal effect
on the share price). There is, moreover, some suggestion that it may even benefit the
source. See Painter, supra note 12, at 192 (indicating that insider trading would help the
bidder put target shares in friendly hands). Thus, it is unclear how the misappropriator
defrauds the source through trading.
292 If the purpose of the misappropriation theory is to protect the integrity of the
market, "why should it matter whether the source of misappropriated information has
been deceived?" Weiss, supra note 12, at 433.
293 "There are forms of improper conduct that section 10(b) does not reach, and the
reason why section 10(b) does not reach them is it is a statute that is framed to reach
fraudulent deceptive activity in connection with securities trading." Transcript of Oral Ar-
gument at *6, O'Hagan (No. 96-842).
294 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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to disclose nonpublic information to the source (with whom he does
have a fiduciary relationship) seems nonsensical. 295 The misappropri-
ation theory, then, requires that the trader disclose his intent to trade
securities on the entrusted information to the source:
Because the deception essential to the misappropriation theory in-
volves feigning fidelity to the source of information, if the fiduciary
discloses to the source that he plans to trade on the nonpublic in-
formation, there is no "deceptive device" and thus no § 10(b) viola-
tion-although the fiduciary-turned-trader may remain liable under
state law for breach of a duty of loyalty.2 96
Disclosure allows the trader to skirt federal sanctions under the misap-
propriation theory, but it does not protect the fiduciary relation-
ship.297 In other words, disclosure does not cure a breach of the
fiduciary duty of loyalty; it merely informs the principal of the misap-
propriator's disloyalty. Because the misappropriation theory is based
on agency law,29 8 a duty to obtain consent more easily reconciles with
the misappropriation theory.2 99 As Justice Thomas pointed out, how-
ever, trading with the principal's consent does not protect the public
investor from an information disadvantage that he cannot possibly
overcome.A00
Implicit in the protection of the fiduciary relationship is the pre-
vention of the illegitimate acquisition or use of inside information.
Based on the Court's analysis, the misappropriation theory fails to
reach trading on stolen inside information and trading on a misap-
propriator's tip. For example, if a nonfiduciary of O'Hagan had sto-
len his briefcase containing nonpublic information and then traded
on that information, the thief's conduct may not fall under the scope
of the misappropriation theory because there was no deceptive breach
295 See Brief of Amid Curiae Law Professors and Counsel in Support of Respondent at 6
n.5, O'Hagan (No. 96-842) ("This duty of 'disclosure' is one that logically can only be owed
to investors in the market, not to the source of nonpublic information (who presumably
already knows the information and would want to keep it confidential).").
296 O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655.
297 The Court noted that even if a trader receives consent, he may still be liable under
Rule 14e-3(a) if he trades in a tender offer context. See i& at 659 n.9.
298 See supra note 289.
299 Even if disclosure protects the source of information, there remains the following
question: to which source does the trader owe the duty to disclose? In other words, if there
is a long chain of communication (from an "outside" entity) before the actual trading
occurs, does the trader have a duty to disclose his intent to trade to the person from whom
he received the information, to the ultimate source of information to whom he may have
no relation, or to everyone in the chain? See Coffee, supra note 11. One may question
whether the trader must make a disclosure at al if he owes no duty of loyalty or confidenti-
ality to anyone in the tipping chain. See i.
300 Although this arrangement prevents the trader from defrauding his source, the
permissive use of confidential business information puts the uninformed public investor
on inferior footing. See supra Part 1V.B.l.
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of fiduciary duty.30 1 In addition, if O'Hagan had conveyed inside in-
formation to a nonfiduciary tippee and the tippee trades on that in-
formation, neither O'Hagan-the misappropriating tipper-nor the
trading tippee is liable under the misappropriation theory.30 2 This
breach of fiduciary duty-the tipping-does not coincide with securi-
ties trading, and consequently, does not meet the "in connection
with" requirement.303 Thus, it should not be surprising that the mis-
appropriation theory, which allows fiduciaries to trade on illegiti-
mately acquired inside information, also allows non-fiduciaries to
trade on illegitimately acquired inside information.
C. Consistency with Prior Case Law
The Court characterized the misappropriation theory as "comple-
mentary" to the classical theory,30 4 reasoning that "it makes scant
sense to hold... O'Hagan a § 10(b) violator if he works for a law firm
representing the target of a tender offer, but not if he works for a law
firm representing the bidder. '305 The complementarity ends here,
however. A comparison of existing insider trading theories-as Table
5 displays-demonstrates that the misappropriation theory is consis-
tent with preexisting law only in the sense that it contains a
hodgepodge of elements from prior insider trading theory. Although
the misappropriation theory in O'Hagan incorporates elements of the
fairness approach, Chiarella's classical theory, Dirks's tippee theory,
and Carpenter's species of fraud, it fails to fuse these elements into a
liability theory that is consistent with any prior formulation.
The misappropriation theory's incongruity with the duty to dis-
close appears most clearly in a takeover context. If the trader works
for the target (or he receives a top from a target insider), he has a
301 See Transcript of Oral Argument at *5, O'Hagan (No. 96-842). See also Seligman,
supra note 12, at 22. ("O'Hagan, by emphasizing fiduciary duties, seems just as clearly to
preclude holding inadvertent or accidental recipients of material nonpublic information
liable.... Similarly, an old fashioned burglar apparently need not fear Rule 10b-5. He
violates the criminal law, but not a fiduciary or similar duty.").
If the misappropriation theory governs the illegitimate acquisition of trading informa-
tion, it would intuitively prohibit both deceptive misappropriation and theft of informa-
tion. See H.R. REP. No. 98-355, at 4-5 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2277-78
("Such conversion for personal gain of information lawfully obtained abuses relationships
of trust and confidence and is no less reprehensible than the outright theft of nonpublic
information.").
302 The Dirks tippee liability theory fails to reach this conduct as well because the Dirks
theory only reaches a trading tippee whose tipper breached a fiduciary duty to the transact-
ing shareholders. See supra Part II.B. In the misappropriation-tippee context, the misap-
propriator-tipper does not owe a fiduciary duty to the transacting shareholders.
303 Generally, trading would occur some time after the tip if it in fact occurs at all. See
supra note 145.
304 O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652. The Court also characterized the adoption of the misap-
propriation theory as consistent with Chiarella and Dirks. See id. at 660-63.
305 d2 at 659.
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TABLE 5
TiHE EvoLUTION OF INSIDER TRADING JURISPRUDENCE
Duty owed to Reason for
Theory Deception Trader's duty whom? duty
Chiarella classi- Nondisclosure Disclose mate- Market Fiduciary rela-
cal theory under Restate- rial, nonpublic tionship
(1980) ment of Torts information
§ 551(2) (a)
Rule 14e-3(a) Nondisclosure Disclose mate- Market Possession of
promulgated (in tender of- rial, nonpublic material, non-
by SEC (1980) fer context) information public informa-
and accepted under Restate- tion
in O'Hagan ment of Con-
(1997) tracts § 161(b)
Dirks tippee Nondisclosure Disclose mate- Market Tipper's
theory (1983) rial, nonpublic breach of fidu-
information ciary duty in
disclosing in-
formation to
tippee
Carpenter"Spe- Deprivation of Obtain consent Principal(s) Misappropria-
cies of Fraud" exclusive use [No disclosure [No disclosure tion of infor-
under the mail of information duty] duty] mation is like
and wire fraud embezzlement
statutes (1987) and constitutes
fraud
O'Hagan mis- Nondisclosure Disclose intent Source(s) Unannounced
appropriation of deprivation to trade on fi- misappropria-
theory (1997) of right to ex- duciary's confi- don of infor-
clusive use of dential mation is a de-
information information ceptive breach
constituting fi- of fiduciary
duciary breach duty
under Restate-
ment of Agency
§ 395
duty to disclose the information to the shareholders under the classical
theory, Rule 14e-3(a), and the tippee theory. If the trader works for
the bidder, however, he has a duty to disclose his trading intent to the
sources under the misappropriation theory. Ironically, the reason for
adopting the misappropriation theory was to prevent just this sort of
incongruity.
Admittedly, the misappropriation theory in O'Hagan resembles
the rule that Carpenter articulates. The Court, however, mistakenly in-
corporated the Carpenter reasoning with regard to mail and wire fraud
statutes in its interpretation of the securities laws, even though the
relevant statutes contain similar language. The purposes of the stat-
utes are different. The mail and wire fraud statutes seek to prevent a
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perpetrator from using the services to commit or further fraud.30 6
The securities laws, on the other hand, intend to protect public inves-
tors, not to guard corporate principals from disloyal agents.
D. The Problem of Application
Apart from its inconsistency with statutory requirements, policy,
and prior case law, the misappropriation theory also presents practical
problems of application. The misappropriation theory strives to pro-
tect the fiduciary relationship. Although the law certainly aims to pro-
tect corporate confidence, the federal securities law is not the proper
means of achieving this goal.3 0 7 State corporate law already governs
internal corporate affairs, and thus, each state may define fiduciary
relationships differently.
When the misappropriation theory premises criminal conduct on
the existence of a fiduciary relationship, it creates "troubling conse-
quences" because state laws contain different definitions of fiduciary
relationships and duties.308 To achieve uniform results across state
lines absent congressional action, the courts would have to develop a
federal common law of fiduciary relationships.30 9 The Court discour-
aged this practice in Santa Fe, however, noting that federal regulation
of fiduciary duties through the securities laws "would overlap and
quite possibly interfere with state corporate law."310 Thus, the misap-
propriation theory presents the theoretical problem of indirect pro-
tection and the practical problem of difficult application.
306 See Brief for the United States, at 45, O'Hagan (No. 96-842). According to Carpenter,
another purpose is to protect newspapers from disloyaljournalists. See Carpenter v. United
States, 484 U.S. 19, 28 (1987) ("We have little trouble in holding that the conspiracy here
to trade on the UJournai]'s confidential information is not outside the reach of the mail and
wire fraud statutes. .. ").
307 The misappropriation theory came before the Court in Chiarella, but the Govern-
ment had not argued for the protection of third parties before the jury. See Brief of Amid
Curiae Law Professors and Counsel in Support of Respondent, at 6, O'Hagan (No. 96-842).
For the securities laws to govern an outsider's fiduciary relationships would be illogical:
"[W]hether or not the 1934 Act imposed a general duty on all persons to disclose material
nonpublic information before trading, the statute was not designed to condition a duty to
disclose on a corporate outsider's relationship either with his employer or derivatively with
his employer's customers." Ik-
308 John C. Coffee,Jr., From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the Criminalization of Fiduci-
ary Breaches and the Problematic Line Between Law and Ethics, 19 AM. CRAM. L. REv. 117, 150
(1981) ("[S]ignificant differences exist among state jurisdictions in terms of the duties that
fiduciaries owe, thereby possibly creating significant disparities in the coverage of federal
criminal law depending on the applicable state civil law.").
309 See Brief of Amid Curiae Law Professors and Counsel in Support of Respondent at
25, O'-agan (No. 96-842).
310 Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977). The Court noted, "Absent a
clear indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant to federalize the substantial por-
tion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions in securities, particularly where
established state policies of corporate regulation would be overridden." Id.
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RETHINKING INSIDER TRADING THEORY
The Supreme Court's rejection of the fairness approach and en-
dorsement of section 551(2) (a) as the foundation of insider trading
liability represent a critical misstep in the development of insider trad-
ing jurisprudence. The subsequent development of the classical and
tippee theories, the promulgation of Rule 14e-3(a), and the emer-
gence of the mail and wire fraud statutes together constitute a twisted
path culminating in the misappropriation theory-a theory that lacks
the statutory requirements, fails to comport with section 10(b) policy,
is inconsistent with prior case law, and is difficult to apply across juris-
dictions. Unfortunately, the O'Hagan Court declined the opportunity
to adopt the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551(2) (e) doctrine and es-
chew the cumbersome hydra of fiduciary-oriented theories. This Part
proposes a simpler, more straightforward approach to the insider
trading problem based on section 551 (2) (e).
A. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551(2) (e)
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551 (2) contains two subsections that
arguably reach insider trading as a fraudulent transaction. In
Chiarella, the Supreme Court quoted section 551(2) (a) to support its
classical theory-that a duty to disclose arises in a transaction between
fiduciaries.31' The Supreme Court, however, has not referred to the
"basic facts" doctrine of section 551 (2) (e) with respect to insider trad-
ing in Chiarella or any other insider trading decision.3 12 In relevant
part, section 551(2) states:
311 See supra note 72 and accompanying text. Chiarella also cites a law review article
that supports the section 551(2) (e) doctrine. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,
228 n.9 (1980) (citing FlemingJames,Jr. & Oscar S. Gray, Misrepresentation-Partf1, 37 Mm.
L. Rxv. 488, 523-27 (1978)).
312 In his Chiarella dissentJustice Blackmun cited section 551(2) (e) and comment 1 of
the RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, but only in reference to the "special facts" doctrine
of Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909). See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 24748 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Blackmun suggested that the "special facts" doctrine and the "basic facts" doc-
trine are identical. See id. In Strong, the Court held that a duty to disclose arises in the
presence of "special facts"; nondisclosure would make the transaction fraudulent. 213 U.S.
at 431-33. Strong, however, involves a private suit for rescission of a contract between a
minority shareholder and a director of a privately held company in a face-to-face transac-
tion under foreign law. See id. at 428-31. The Court did not premise its decision on the
fiduciary relationship between the parties. See i&. at 431. Thus, applying the "special facts"
doctrine to insider trading-involving anonymous shareholders of publicly held corpora-
tions in an impersonal transaction under federal law-is questionable. Demonstrating
nondisclosure liability in a rescission of contract case is considerably easier. As RESTATE-
MENT (SEconD) OF CoNTRACrs § 161(b) states:
A person's non-disclosure of a fact known to him is equivalent to an asser-
tion that the fact does not exist in the following cases only:
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(2) One party to a business transaction is under a duty to exercise
reasonable care to disclose to the other before the transaction is
consummated,
(a) matters known to him that the other is entitled to know
because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confi-
dence between them; and
(e) facts basic to the transaction, if he knows that the other is
about to enter into it under a mistake as to them, and that the
other, because of the relationship between them, the customs of the
trade or other objective circumstances, would reasonably expect a
disclosure of those facts.3 13
Thus, subsection (e) illustrates an additional way (aside from a fiduci-
ary relationship) in which the duty to disclose arises. If A knows that B
is mistaken as to the basic facts of the transaction-those facts that go
to the essence of the transaction 3 14 -and that B reasonably would ex-
pect to be informed of these facts, then A has a duty to disclose.3 15
B. The Court's Silence on Section 551(2) (e)
The Supreme Court has been silent on the applicability of Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 551(2) (e) to section 10(b) analysis and insider
trading. In Chiarella, the Court seemed to reject the section 551 (2) (e)
doctrine when it rejected the fairness approach of Cady, Roberts and
Texas Gulf Sulphur. A closer look reveals that this conclusion is not
unassailable. In any case, what is clear is that the Court did not apply
section 551 (2) (e) to the insider trading problem and that it has yet to
give the reasons behind this decision.
1. Rejection of a Duty to Disclose Material Facts
At first glance, the Chiarella Court appears to reject the "basic
facts" doctrine outlined in section 551 (2) (e) as a basis for nondisclo-
sure liability: "Formulation of [a general duty between all participants
in market transactions to forego actions based on material, nonpublic
information] ... departs radically from the established doctrine that
duty arises from a specific relationship between two parties."316 When
(b) where he knows that disclosure of the fact would correct a mistake
of the other party as to a basic assumption on which that party is making
the contract and if non-disclosure of the fact amounts to a failure to act in
good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing.
RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CoNraCTs § 161(b) (1981) (typeface altered).
313 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 551 (1977) (typeface altered).
314 For more discussion on what constitutes a "basic fact," see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 551 cmt.j (1977) (defining a basic fact as one "that is assumed by the parties as
a basis for the transaction itself").
315 See id. § 551(2) (e).
316 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980).
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the Court asserted that market traders have no duty to disclose "mate-
rial" facts, however, it actually made no specific reference to section
551(2) (e) or to the "basic facts" doctrine. 31 7 The Court has defined
an omitted fact as material "if there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider it important... [and] there
[is] substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would
have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly
altered the 'total mix' of information made available."318 A basic fact
is a material fact that goes to the basis of the transaction. If Chiarella
does reject the "basic facts" doctrine when it rejects the fairness ap-
proach, it offers no explanation why § 551(2) (a) represents the "es-
tablished doctrine" of nondisclosure liability while § 551(2) (e)
constitutes a "radical departure."
2. A Newer Doctrine of Liability
Whether or not the Supreme Court rejected section 551(2) (e) as
part of nondisclosure liability, however, the Court certainly did not
adopt it with respect to section 10(b) insider trading.3 19 In Chiarella,
the Court suggested that only the "established doctrine" of fraudulent
nondisclosure articulated under section 551 (2) (a) gives rise to section
10(b) liability.3 20 Although section 551 (2) (e) represents a newer doc-
trine of nondisclosure liability not widely recognized at the time the
securities laws and regulations were drafted, the drafters probably in-
tended the scope of the securities laws to conform to changing per-
ceptions of fraud.
I.... Under the traditional rule of nondisclosure, "[s]ilence does not
constitute [actionable] concealment. '3 21 The law, however, has never
applied this rule of nonliability to fiduciary relationships.322 Because
Congress drafted the Act in 1934 and the SEC drafted Rule 10b-5 in
317 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
318 TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); see also Basic Inc. v. Levin-
son, 485 U.S. 224, 238-40 (1988) (adopting the TSC materiality test for Rule 10b-5).
319 See supra note 296 and accompanying text.
320 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233 ("[E]stablished doctrine [indicates] that duty arises from
a specific relationship between two parties"). See id. at 230 ("[Nondisclosure] liability is
premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence be-
tween parties to a transaction."); id. at 232 ("No duty [to disclose] could arise .... He was
not their agent, he was not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had placed
their trust and confidence.").
321 James & Gray, supra note 311, at 523 (second alteration in original) (quoting Fried-
rich Kessler & Edith Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of
Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 H{v. L. REv. 401, 441 (1964) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
322 As McNulty and Hanson state:
[T]he general rule of nonliability for silence never applied to fiduciaries.
Under the common law of trusts, a fiduciary does not have the right to
remain silent or inactive to the detriment of the beneficiary. Section 551 in
effect lifts this preexisting rule from trust law and makes it a part of tort law.
1999] 1409
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
1942, the Court may have believed that Congress and the SEC did not
intend section 10(b) tW prohibit acts within reach of today's broader
nondisclosure liability doctrine. After all, the traditional doctrine
only prohibited nondisclosure in a fiduciary relationship (section
551 (2) (a)), and section 551(2) (e) did not appear in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts until 1977. Thus, if the Court applied the modem
trend of broader liability under section 551(2) (e), it could expand
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability beyond what the drafters
intended.
This argument for rejecting section 551(2)(e) is inaccurate at
least in light of O'Hagan. The Supreme Court determined that sec-
tion 10(b) reaches beyond the section 551(2)(a) definition of
fraud.3 23 Thus, if section 10 (b) can extend to undisclosed duty of loy-
alty breaches under the misappropriation theory, as in O'Hagan, it
also can reach a relatively new doctrine of fraud under section
551(2) (e). In fact, this broad reading of section 10(b) may even en-
compass the fraudulent misrepresentation of the fairness approach.
Moreover, the Supreme Court itself has recognized that securities
antifraud provisions should apply flexibly and encompass more than
the technical meaning of fraud.3 24 In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,325
the Court asserted that Congress had intended securities legislation
that it enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds to "be construed
'not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial
purposes."' 326 Indeed, Congress and the SEC drafted section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 in broad language, similar to constitutional provi-
sions.3 27 The unspecific language in turn has yielded "law [that] is
surely as much judge made as is the classic common law."328 Thus, the
1934 Congress and the 1942 SEC likely intended these antifraud pro-
visions to evolve with and respond to changing circumstances.
If the definition of "fraud" can change and adhere to current
legal and ethical attitudes,329 then section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 can
PatrickJ. McNulty & DanielJ. Hanson, Liability for Aiding and Abetting by Silence or Inaction:
An Unfounded Doctrine, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 14, 34 (1993).
323 See supra notes 264-68 and accompanying text.
324 See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979); SEC v. Sloan, 436
U.S. 103, 116 (1978).
325 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
326 Id. at 200 (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972)
(quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963) (second
internal quotation marks omitted))).
327 See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 780 (suggesting that § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
are "virtually as vague as the Due Process Clause").
328 1d. Insider trading "law is almost entirely the product ofjudicial and administrative
construction." Langevoort, supra note 10, at 3.
329 Commentators have suggested:
It is not the intent of this rule to provide a cause of action to every person
who in retrospect feels he or she has made a bad deal. Rather, the rule's
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reach conduct that the newer section 551 (2) (e) proscribes. In other
words, even if the "basic facts" doctrine "depart[ed] radically from the
established doctrine"330 when the Court decided Chiarella, the Court
should have readdressed the issue seventeen years later in O'Hagan.
Even in 1976, the "basic facts" doctrine represented a trend toward
broader liability;3 3 ' by 1997, even more case law must have emerged in
support of section 551(2) (e).3 32 Yet the O'Hagan Court unhesitat-
ingly, or perhaps blindly, followed precedent without addressing the
developing nondisclosure liability jurisprudence. If the Court wished
to expand the construction of section 10(b), it should have included
the doctrine of section 551 (2) (e) rather than a theory predicated on
an undisclosed fiduciary breach external to the transaction.
C. Application of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551(2) (e)
Because the Supreme Court only affirmatively rejected a general
duty to disclose "material, nonpublic information"33 3 but did not ad-
dress whether there was a duty to disclose facts basic to the transac-
tion, 334 perhaps the Court was willing to recognize section 551 (2) (e)
as part of nondisclosure liability doctrine. It just may have felt that
the "basic facts" doctrine does not apply to insider trading or section
10(b) liability under the presumption that inside information consti-
tutes material facts but does not rise to the level of basic facts. Alter-
natively, the Court may have decided that inside information is basic
to an insider trading transaction, but it concluded that insider trading
fails to satisfy some other element of section 551(2) (e).
For section 551(2) (e) to apply, insider trading must meet three
elements: (1) the undisclosed inside information goes to the essence
of the transaction, (2) the trader knows his transacting counterparties
purpose is to deal with situations in which nondisclosure is abhorrent to
society's sense of fairness. For example, failure to disclose in a house sale
that the house is riddled with termites is so offensive that it is tantamount to
swindling, and it is only in such circumstances that this rule finds its
application.
McNulty & Hanson, supra note 322, at 36 (footnote omitted).
330 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980).
331 Recently, many exceptions have mitigated the harshness of the traditional rule,
indicating a trend toward a broader rule of liability. SeeJames & Gray, supra note 311, at
523-27. The basic facts doctrine did not exist in the original RESTATEMENT OF TORTS. The
American Law Institute (ALI), however, proposed the current section 551 (2) (e) in 1964 in
response to nondisclosure cases that offended society's sense of equity. See RESTATEMENT
(SEcOND) OF TORTS § 551 (Tentative Draft No. 10, 1964). Nonetheless, it would be an
exaggeration, if not disingenuous, to suggest that the basic facts doctrine "departs radi-
cally" from the fraudulent nondisclosure doctrine. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233.
332 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 app. (1989).
333 See supra note 74.
334 "'Facts basic to the transaction' should not be equated with 'material facts' or 'facts
important to the transaction.'" McNulty & Hanson, supra note 322, at 36. These terms,
however, have been used interchangeably. See, e.g., supra note 332.
1999] 1411
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
are trading under a mistake that resulted from this nondisclosure, and
(3) his counterparties reasonably expect the disclosure of this infor-
mation because of other objective circumstances. 335
To satisfy the first element, the information in insider trading
must constitute a basic fact that goes to the essence of the transac-
tion.3 3 6 The O'Hagan Court recognized that O'Hagan's knowledge of
the impending tender offer had been material, but was it basic to the
securities transaction? One may argue that this fact was merely mate-
rial rather than basic: Even if the trader knows what the price proba-
bly will be in the future, the current price-the essence of the insider
trading transaction-still may be accurate. Moreover, the trader does
not know for certain that the anticipated tender offer actually will take
place.
Despite the timing and uncertainty of the tender offer, however,
material information still may rise to the level of basic information, as
the following hypothetical demonstrates. Suppose the value of a tar-
get share is $70 when the probability of a tender offer for the target
company is negligible. Then suppose that a potential bidder prepares
for a tender offer and plans to buy target shares at $100 each. Next,
suppose that the attorney structuring the deal for the bidder trades on
this information, and at the time of the trade he knows with about
ninety percent probability that the tender offer will occur. When the
attorney trades with target shareholders at $70 per share, he knows
each share is worth approximately $97.a37
Thus, the facts that the share will have a price of $100, that it will
attain that price in the near future, and that at the time of trading it
has about a ninety percent probability of rising to its future price, to-
gether constitute the basic fact that the market price grossly underval-
ues the share. In combination, these material facts rise to the level of
335 See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2) (e) (1977).
336 See id. cmt. j.
337 The actual share value is the sum of (1) the expected price multiplied by the
probability that the share will reach that price in the near future and (2) the current price
multiplied by the probability of it remaining at that price (i.e., $97 = $100(90%) +
$70(10%)).
According to the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), "today's stock price is the best
guess of tomorrow's stock price because current prices already reflect all information about
the security." Angie Woo, Note, Appraisal Rights in Mergers of Publidy-Held Delaware Corpora-
tions: Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, and Something B.L. U.E., 68 S. GAL. L.
REv. 719, 734 n.71 (1995) (emphasis added) (citing RICHARD A. BiEALE & STEWART C.
MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 300 (4th ed. 1991)); see also H.R. REP. No. 98-
3555, at 2 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2275 ("The prices of the vast major-
ity of actively traded securities reflect available public information about companies and
the economy.").
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a basic fact because the high probability of the tender offer creates a
disparity between actual and market value.33 8,
This disparity between actual and market value and the fact that
the insider trader capitalizes on this disparity satisfies the second ele-
ment of section 551(2) (e). The disparity indicates that the public is
unaware of the inside information. Had this information been dis-
closed to the public, market forces would have closed the gap between
actual value and market price. Thus, when an individual knows this
disparity exists and trades on it, he intentionally exploits the mistake
of his public investor counterparties resulting from the nondisclosure
of the basic information. 339
The third element-that the counterparies expect reasonable
disclosure-is slightly more problematic because of its open-ended na-
ture.340 The Restatement (Second) of Torts, however, suggests that the
fact that an uninformed party reasonably could not expect to discover
his ignorance is significant in determining section 551(2) (e) liabil-
ity.341 In insider trading, the party with superior knowledge trades on
confidential business information. Consequently, the public cannot
discover the insider's knowledge through reasonable investigation.3 42
Another relevant factor is the uninformed party's reliance on the
other party's good faith and honesty. In anonymous markets, reliance
is difficult to prove.3 43 In insider trading, however, many commenta-
tors regard investor confidence as essential to the securities market.34
Thus, because the public relies on fair and honest markets, an unin-
formed, investor reasonably would expect the disclosure of any basic
338 This analysis is similar to what market analysts have termed the "mosaic theory."
BriefofAmicus CuriaeAssociation for Investment Management and Research in Support of
Petitioner at 10, O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (No. 96-842) (stating that the "mosaic theory"
permits an analyst to "use a significant conclusion derived from perceptive analysis of pub-
lic information and nonmaterial, nonpublic information as the basis of a securities recom-
mendation or transaction . . . even if the conclusion derived would have constituted
restricted material, nonpublic information had it been communicated directly to the ana-
lyst by an insider"). Whether the level of material facts always can rise to the level of basic
facts in this manner is beyond the scope of this Note.
339 It seems that the possibility of confidential information may mean that the market
contains a large number of "wrong" prices. However, every instance in which a trader
profits from an undervalued stock does not constitute insider trading. Insider trading oc-
curs only when the trader intentionally exploits inside information. One who profits with-
out inside information is just fortunate.
340 See RsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 551 cmt. 1 (1977) (acknowledging that "[i]t
is extremely difficult to be specific as to the factors that give rise to this known, and reason-
able, expectation of disclosure").
341 See id. cmts. k, 1 illus. 9-12.
342 This idea is similar to the access to information theory. See supra note 94 and ac-
companying text.
343 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
344 "Insider trading threatens these markets by undermining the public's expectations
of honest and fair securities markets where all participants play by the same rules." H.R.
REP. No. 98-355, at 2 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CA.AN. 2274, 2275.
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fact regarding the price of a security. When an insider possesses infor-
mation that is inaccessible to the public investor, the investor reason-
ably would expect that the securities laws would prohibit the insider
from trading on that information.
The section 551(2) (e) approach is superior to the section
551(2) (a) approach and the misappropriation theory because it di-
rectly addresses the problem of insider trading. An individual who
engages in insider trading possesses material, nonpublic information.
This information almost always rises to the level of a basic fact that
goes to the stock price-the essence of the transaction. Because this
information is nonpublic, the trader knows that public investors do
not have access to it. The trader also knows that because of the policy
of maintaining open and honest markets, the public expects full dis-
closure of this information if the information assists in trading. Sec-
tion 551(2) (a) reaches this exploitation of unfair informational
advantage only if the trader is transacting with fiduciaries, 45 and the
misappropriation theory reaches this conduct if this only breaches a
duty to use of information by fiduciaries.3 46 Section 551(2) (e) pro-
hibits all transacting parties from exploiting unfair informational ad-
vantages.3 47 The next Part proposes how insider trading law may assist
in the application of the section 551 (2) (e) doctrine.
VI
A PROPOSAL TO AiD IN THE APPLICATION OF
SECTION 551 (2) (e)
Because the securities laws purport to maintain honest and open
markets, it is reasonable for the public investor to believe that the laws
compel everyone to play fairly in the market. This notion of fair play
explains why the parity-of-information approach had been so appeal-
ing prior to Chiarella. The Supreme Court, however, chose other ave-
nues to prohibit insider trading because of a disbelief that the actual
language of the securities laws required such fairness. The Court pro-
ceeded conservatively in banning insider trading first by insiders348
and then by their tippees. 349 After seventeen years of congressional
inaction, the Supreme Court then controversially banned insider trad-
ing by breaching outsiders.350
Intuitively, insider trading law would be clearer if Congress had
defined the problem rather than allowing the Court to attempt to im-
345 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (2) (a) (1977).
346 See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997).
347 See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2) (e) (1977).
348 See supra Part II.A
349 See supra Part HI.B.
350 See supra Part III.
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pose criminal liability with the catchall provision of section 10(b).35 1
Congress, however, seems averse to defining "insider trading":
"[E]vidence seems to show that any effort to define insider trading
would result in, at best, a slightly less generalized rule than lOb-5 and,
at worst, a rule that leaves gaping holes, previously referred to in hear-
ings on the Code as 'large enough to drive a truck through."'3 52 Con-
gress's unwillingness to draft a statute targeting the insider trading
problem, the SEC's struggle to propose accepted rules and theo-
ries,3 53 and the Court's failure to adopt an appropriate approach to-
ward section 10(b) liability suggest that the solution may lie elsewhere.
If Congress, the SEC, or the courts were to persuade the securi-
ties exchanges to develop insider trading prohibition rules for their
broker members, the exchanges then could establish a "custom of the
trade" and thus allow the courts to apply section 10(b) to individuals
through a section 551(2) (e) approach.3 54 Professor Coffee has sug-
gested that in the absence of congressional or SEC action, the best
alternative for eliminating a loophole in existing insider trading the-
ory is through the exchanges themselves-by self-regulatory organiza-
tion (SRO) rules.3 55 Professor Coffee noted that "SRO rules seem
adequate to regulate broker dealers, but lack the deterrent threat nec-
essary to stop 'true' insider traders, such as Mr. O'Hagan."35 6 The
section 551(2) (e) approach, however, mitigates this problem-rules
that govern broker dealers may govern anyone who trades securities.
If SRO rules can establish a "custom of the trade," the courts can de-
termine that the insider trading of any individual constitutes a section
551 (2) (e) fraud. The courts then can apply the antifraud provisions
of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to this fraud in connection with
trading.
Encouraging exchanges to draft insider trading prohibition rules
would not be difficult. Because exchanges typically profit from a high
volume of trading, they strive to attract investors. Insider trading de-
ters investors because "[i]nvestors are reluctant to play in what they
351 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
352 H.R. REP. No. 98-355, at 14 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CAN. 2274, 2287.
353 The SEC was unable to persuade the Court to adopt either the fairness approach in
Chiarella or its tippee liability theory in Dirks. The Supreme Court has not yet fully en-
dorsed Rule 14e-3(a).
354 The author is indebted to Professor Richard Painter for this suggestion.
355 See Coffee, supra note 11. In addressing the problem of prohibiting trading when
the source consents while distinguishing it from trading in the misappropriation context,
Professor Coffee proposed that SRO rules could provide the solution: "The most feasible
answer is SRO rules, which could be adopted by both the NASD and the stock exchanges
and which could preclude member firms from trading on material, non-public informa-
tion, even where the information had been voluntarily disclosed by the issuer." Id.
356 1&
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perceive to be a rigged game."3 57 Consequently, creating insider trad-
ing prohibition rules is in the best interest of exchanges.
If insider trading law were to persuade the New York Stock Ex-
change (NYSE), for example, to design its own rules prohibiting in-
sider trading, the NYSE could provide the Court with a solid section
551(2) (e) model. Suppose the NYSE promulgates a disclosure rule
that requires a broker publicly to disclose any inside information prior
to trading (with its securities expertise, the NYSE could define ade-
quately "inside information"). This rule firmly would establish a cus-
tom of the trade, which the courts could apply to insiders or outsiders
(brokers or not), in instances in which a public investor "would rea-
sonably expect a disclosure."
CONCLUSION
To be sure, this Note's proposal of a Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 551(2) (e) framework does not signify a significant departure from
the pre-Chiarella fairness approach. Rather, this Note argues that sec-
tion 551 (2) (e) provides ajustification for the fairness approach which
the Court was unable to discover. Although existing theory after the
Supreme Court's adoption of the misappropriation theory in O'Hagan
prohibits most insider trading once covered by the fairness approach,
significant loopholes persist. Because section 551 (2) (e) permits it, in-
sider trading law can re-adopt this fairness approach rather than en-
dure numerous, narrow, fiduciary-based theories attempting to
achieve the fairness by indirect means. The misappropriation theory
restricts the traitor for who he knows. The fairness approach restricts
the trader for what he knows.
Admittedly the fairness approach is not flawless and, if adopted,
should not constitute the last step in the development of insider trad-
ing prohibition. Indeed, it may chill benign and even desirable con-
duct given the intricate problems involved in tippee trading.3 58
357 Pritchard, supra note 12, at 49.
358 This blanket prohibition of the fairness approach may hinder securities analysts
from carrying out their duties. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text. However,
there is some indication that this problem is not as serious as the Court perceived. See
Dalley, supra note 12, at 1325 ("There is no reason to tailor insider trading regulation to
specifically deal with the analyst problem.").
The fairness approach may also punish traders who have unwittingly eavesdropped on
the communication of inside information. See SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756, 766 (W.D.
Okla. 1984) (holding that the fiduciary-based framework of post-Chiarella insider trading
law does not reach trading tippees who had no reason to know that the tipper had
breached a fiduciary duty to the transacting shareholders). The courts have been unwill-
ing to extend securities law to traders who stumble upon inside information.
The applicability of the fairness approach, in particular the basic facts doctrine, to
insider trading is questionable when the tippee himself lacks information of the security he
trades. Suppose a tipper tells a tippee to buy stock X When the tippee asks, "Why?", the
tipper responds, "Just trust me," instead of offering any basic information like, "Because
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However, the law can carve out exceptions to an overinclusive rule3 59
and the fairness approach represents a good starting point as it did
almost forty years ago.
The law must prevent insider trading because it threatens market
integrity and fairness, not because it threatens fiduciary relationships.
Insider trading is like playing cards with a marked deck.3 60 No one
cares whether one has stolen the deck from his friend, just that he is
playing with it. Properly drafted SRO insider trading prohibition
rules would enable the enforcement of section 10(b) through section
551(2) (e). By creating house rules that call for the disclosure of
marked cards, the game can establish a custom that prevents the ex-
ploitation of innocent players before the deal.
the stock will split in the next few days." It is unclear whether courts could determine that
the tippee's knowledge of the tipper's access to certain information in conjunction with
the recommendation amounts to a basic fact that must be disclosed.
359 After all, insider trading law has endured the overinclusiveness of section 16-the
original insider trading provision. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
360 See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 930.
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